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This dissertation examines questions pertaining to international migration, par-
ticipation in poverty alleviation programs, and inequality of opportunity using a
subjective well-being approach. The theoretical objective of this dissertation is
two-fold - (i) to examine subjective well-being as a factor that induces individuals
to make critical decisions and (ii) to examine whether seeking agency or a better
life affects subjective well-being.
Chapter 1 examines the effect of life satisfaction on intention to migrate abroad
using survey data on 18 Latin American countries. Three key findings emerge that
support life satisfaction as a significant driver of intention to migrate abroad. First,
the findings suggest that reporting high life satisfaction is negatively associated with
intention to migrate abroad controlling for education and other background factors.
Second, I find a consistently negative and significant effect of the interaction between
high life satisfaction and education suggesting that more educated individuals
reporting high life satisfaction are less likely to consider migrating abroad as
compared to more educated individuals reporting low life satisfaction. And third,
even after controlling for relative deprivation the negative effect of the high life
satisfaction and education interaction term on intention to migrate abroad remains
statistically significant suggesting that international migration decisions of those
with higher education are not solely driven by economic motives. In addition, I
find that those who are highly educated (college and higher) are more likely to
consider migrating abroad, controlling for life satisfaction and relative deprivation,
mainly due to weak economic outlook of and low wages in the home country.
Chapter 2 uses non-experimental regression models and quasi-experimental
propensity score matching models to examine the effect of being a recipient of
livelihood protecting in-kind social transfers and livelihood promoting microfinance
on subjective and objective economic well-being. I find that being a microfinance
recipient has significant positive effect on subjective economic well-being of the
very poor households. This implies that being a recipient of livelihood promoting
poverty alleviation programs makes poor households “feel less poor”. Further, being
a microfinance recipient also has a significant positive effect on the consumption or
objective economic well-being of the very poor households. Disaggregating the pos-
itive effect on consumption reveals that being a microfinance recipient significantly
increases human capital development expenditures, particularly education and
health. In contrast, there is a significant negative effect on the subjective economic
well-being of recipients of livelihood protecting social transfers, but the effect does
not hold for households that are very poor. Therefore, there is seemingly a stigma
associated with receiving social transfers. Contrary to expectation, being a social
transfers recipient has a negative effect on consumption, which is possibly due to a
substitution effect.
Chapter 3 uses the Human Opportunity Index (HOI) to measure the degree
of inequality of opportunity for rural-urban migrant children as compared to
urban and rural children in China. I find that migrant children face significantly
more inequality of opportunity in basic opportunities as compared to their urban
and rural counterparts. Specifically, they experience high levels of inequality
of opportunity in education and in basic services such as water and sanitation.
With respect to completing primary education on time, only about half of all
opportunities needed to ensure universal access are both available and allocated
equitably for migrant children as compared to urban and rural children. Similarly,
for water and sanitation, opportunities available and equitably distributed are
significantly less for migrant children as compared to urban and rural children.
Further, within the sub-group of migrants, recent migrants, that is, those who
have been residing in the urban area for less than three years are worse-off when
compared to migrants who have lived in the city for longer periods of time. Testing
the association between migrant childrens’ HOI and the subjective well-being of
their households suggests that an increase in the HOI is positively and significantly
associated with household well-being measured in terms of subjective standard of
living and feelings of upward mobility. This implies that improving the outcomes
for migrant children could be a policy tool for improving the well-being of migrant
households.
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Chapter 1
Is subjective well-being of concern to potential migrants from Latin
America?
1.1 Introduction
Migration has long been a mechanism for those in search of better opportunities
and a good life. A critical debate in the migration domain relates to the migration
and specifically international migration of educated and skilled individuals from
developing and emerging economies. The 2011 International Migration Outlook
states that there is a rise in immigration numbers of students and skilled workers
into OECD countries and though there was a decline during the recession period,
the overall trend continues to be positive (OECD, 2011). It further states that
countries and regions with skilled and educated labor, especially China, India, and
Latin America, continue to be among the top out-migration countries.
These trends raise an interesting theoretical and policy puzzle. Neoclassical eco-
nomic theories have traditionally argued that raising incomes in sending countries
can reduce international migration. However, even though most of these countries
are among the fastest growing emerging economies and have seen wage increases
between 6 and 9 percent over the last five years, they continue to experience large
international migration outflows year after year, a significant portion of which is
out-migration of skilled and educated labor. Further, despite emerging economies
attracting huge foreign investments and creating jobs for skilled workers, they
are constantly striving to hold on to their skilled and educated labor. According
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to a 2001 McKinsey study, roughly a third of the professionals in research and
development leave developing countries in Asia and Latin America to work in the
United States, European Union, or Japan (Devan and Tewari, 2001). According
to the 2010 American Community Survey, of all Latin American-born migrants
into the United States who are 25 years and older, 25 percent are high school
graduates while 28 percent have college and higher level of education (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2010). These trends and statistics are suggestive of mechanisms guiding
international migration decisions that go beyond economic growth and incomes
and may plausibly explain part of the puzzle.
Figure 1.1 – Education levels among foreign-born migrants in the US
Some explanations can be found in studies that examine inter-regional migration
within the US as a function of quality of life (Cebula and Vedder, 1973; Liu, 1975;
Hsieh and Liu, 1983). In these studies, quality of life is quantified as a “set of wants”
that includes health and welfare provision, educational development, participation
in political activity as well as social and environmental factors such as crime rate
and pollution. The key finding that emerges from this literature is that in the
2
long-run the pursuance of better quality of life turns out to be more significant than
per capita income for an individual making a migration decision. While quality
of life, as defined in these studies, captures objective wants and circumstances, it
does not capture the individuals’ unobserved subjective experiences of life that
may also drive migration. For instance, economic growth and industrialization can
transform personal values about how and where to live, mere crime and corruption
rates do not capture the psychological cost of victimization that may induce people
to move, and the notion of a “better life” in itself is highly subjective and may
differ for those who are more educated (Diener and Suh, 1997; Graham, 2010).
Expanding upon this body of work, I therefore examine intention to migrate abroad
as a function of life satisfaction, which is a cognitive-evaluative sense of satisfaction
with life, in addition to economic and quality of life factors.
Using data on Latin America, this chapter investigates subjective well-being and
more specifically, life satisfaction, as a mechanism that may be driving international
migration decisions especially of those who are more educated. Instead of examining
linkages solely between life satisfaction and intention to migrate abroad, I also
analyze relative deprivation to identify possible off-setting effects of economic
factors. Relative deprivation refers to the economic position of an individual as
compared to a specific reference group. This implies that relative to the reference
group, the individual may be economically “better off” or “worse off”. Relative
deprivation is a crucial factor as previous studies have found that income relative
to a reference group is closely linked with household migration decisions. Stark
(1984) and Stark and Taylor (1989, 1991) posit that individuals within a household
undertake migration not only to increase the absolute income of the household
but also to improve the economic position of their household relative to a specific
reference group. Literature on the linkages between life satisfaction and migration is
very limited. A study by DeJong (2000), which explicitly addresses life satisfaction
and rural-urban migration decisions in Thailand, finds that evaluation of life
satisfaction based on income, comfort, stimulation, and affiliation along with norms
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about migration are important determinants of intention to migrate. However,
his analysis focuses on internal or within-country migration. There is no previous
study that has examined intention to migrate abroad from a subjective well-being
perspective while controlling for relative deprivation.
This chapter aims to contribute both to the literature on international migration
as well as on subjective well-being. It examines whether life satisfaction is significant
in driving international migration decisions after accounting differences in objective
well-being. In particular, it investigates the effect of life satisfaction on the migration
intentions of individuals who are more educated and the factors that reinforce the
effect. In doing so, it aims to identify whether the individuals with higher education
who intend to migrate are possibly “frustrated achievers”, that is, individuals who
are more educated and objectively (based on income or wealth) better off but still
less satisfied (Graham and Pettinato, 2002). I do not aim to make an argument
for or against migration of more educated individuals but rather aim to provide an
alternative explanation to their migration decisions.
The key findings of this chapter are that more educated individuals reporting
high life satisfaction have weaker intentions to migrate abroad as compared to
more educated individuals reporting low life satisfaction and the result holds
across different specifications. Even after controlling for relative deprivation,
the interaction between high life satisfaction and education continues to have a
significant negative effect on intention to migrate abroad. In addition, I find that
those who are highly educated (college and higher) are more likely to consider
migrating abroad, controlling for life satisfaction and relative deprivation, mainly
due to weak economic outlook of and low wages in the home country. The findings
suggest that subjective well-being is a plausible mechanism driving international
migration decisions besides income differentials, particularly of those with higher
education.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews existing literature and
findings on migration, relative deprivation, and subjective well-being. Section 1.3
4
describes the data, discusses the methodological framework and empirical strategy,
and presents descriptive statistics. Section 1.4 presents the main findings. Section
1.5 discusses the mechanisms driving intention to migrate abroad. Section 1.6
concludes.
1.2 Review of literature
While there is literature examining relative deprivation and migration, and life
satisfaction and migration separately, there is no study that links the three variables
in the context of international migration decisions. Existing literature on relative
deprivation and migration argues that in addition to absolute income, migration
decisions within a household are also significantly correlated with the desire to
improve economic position of the household relative to a specific reference group
(Stark, 1984; Stark and Taylor, 1989, 1991). The relative deprivation construct has
been systematically and in detail explained by Crosby (1982) in his study on relative
deprivation felt by working women. He argues that relative deprivation arises due
to two preconditions - (i) to want what one does not have and (ii) feeling that one
deserves whatever one wants but does not have. Using the economic approach
Stark and Yitzhaki (1988) further refined the construct of relative deprivation by
building upon Runciman’s (1966 as quoted in Stark and Yitzhaki 1988) conditions
for an individual to feel relatively deprived. Runciman defined four conditions - (i)
a person does not have X (ii) the person sees other person or persons as having
X (iii) the person wants X and (iv) he sees it as feasible that he should have X.
The relativity of the concept is due to (ii) and (iv). The feeling of deprivation is
defined by (i) and (iii).
Stark and Taylor (1991) empirically test the effect of relative deprivation on
migration using Mexico-to-U.S. migration data. They use a sample of 423 adults
from 61 randomly selected households in two villages in Mexico and collect data
on both individual and household characteristics. Their findings support their
hypothesis that greater relative deprivation in terms of income is associated with
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a higher probability of a household allocating its labor time towards migration.
In addition, they find that there is a significant negative effect of the relative
deprivation squared term on migration, indicating that individuals at the bottom
of the income distribution may not engage in migration due to the associated
costs. Bhandari (2004) tests the relative deprivation hypothesis in Nepal using
the Chitwan Valley Family Study and the Population and Environment Study
surveys consisting of observations from 1805 households. Instead of income, he
defines relative deprivation in terms of ownership and access to land. Based on
this definition of relative deprivation he finds that after controlling for the effects
of other socioeconomic factors, those with lesser landholdings (in terms of area)
were more likely to engage in migration than those with greater landholdings.
However, the effect was not statistically significant for those in the bottom-most
category of landholdings suggesting that subsistence and survival was probably
more important to these households than allocating resources towards migration.
Thus, his findings are in accordance with those of Stark and Taylor (1991).
There is new literature on life satisfaction and happiness of immigrants as
compared to natives. These studies have found that when compared to natives,
immigrants report lower levels of happiness and this holds true in various cultural
and social contexts (Safi, 2010; Bartram, 2011; Bobowik, 2011). Explanations
offered for immigrants’ low levels of happiness are that immigrants miscalculate
how their happiness will be affected once they migrate and do not anticipate that
their aspirations will rise as they start comparing themselves with the natives. For
instance, both Safi (2010) and Bartram (2011) find that even after residing in the
destination country for decades, immigrants in Europe and United States report
low levels of happiness as compared to natives. However, evidence on whether low
levels of life satisfaction or happiness drive migration is very scarce. In the one
study that examines internal migration and life satisfaction using the 1992 and
1994 waves of the Thailand National Migration Survey, DeJong (2000) finds that
evaluation of life satisfaction based on income, comfort, stimulation, and affiliation
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along with norms about migration are important determinants of intention to
migrate. In addition, he finds gender differences in expectations and evaluations of
life satisfaction, which in turn affect the migration behavior of men and women
differently. While women are driven to migrate by lower income and stimulation,
men’s intentions are promoted by affiliation and networks.
In summary, both relative deprivation and life satisfaction examined separately
have a significant effect on migration decisions. Drawing upon this literature, this
chapter evaluates the effect of life satisfaction on intention to migrate abroad after
controlling for effects of relative deprivation using nationally representative survey
data.
1.3 Data and methodological framework
1.3.1 Dataset
I use four waves of the Latinobarometro survey from 2004 to 2007 for the analysis.
The surveys are repeated cross-sections conducted annually and contain approx-
imately 1000 observations each from 18 countries across Latin America which
include: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Re-
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I analyze the dataset as repeated cross-
sections (RCS) with year, country, and year-country interaction fixed effects. The
inclusion of fixed effects controls for changes in migration intentions that may
be a result of country and/or year specific factors such as bad economy, political
turmoil, conflict, or disaster. The RCS model can be written as:
yit = α + β1xit + β2Yt + β3Di + β4Yt ∗Di + εit (1.1)
where, xit represents the set of time-varying and country-varying variables, Yt is
the year fixed effect, Di are dummies for each country, and Yt ∗Di are the country
and year interaction fixed effects.
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1.3.2 Methodological framework
The research question that this chapter examines is: Is overall life satisfaction
significant in explaining intention to migrate, particularly of individuals with higher
education, after controlling for relative deprivation? Three key variables need to
be operationalized and delved into - intention to migrate, life satisfaction, and
relative deprivation.
The use of intention to migrate instead of actual migration numbers as the depen-
dent variable is both data-driven as well as theory-driven. The Latinobarometro
only asks respondents about their intention to migrate abroad by posing the ques-
tion “Have you and your family ever seriously considered going to live abroad?”
and does not ask about actual present or past movements. It may be argued that
intentions are not reflective of actual migration patterns and therefore examining
intentions may be of little relevance to migration policy. However, previous research
on intention to migrate or the behavioral aspect of migration suggests otherwise
and justifies the use of intentions to migrate as a predictor of actual migration.
Among the first to investigate the socio-psychological dimensions of within-city
migration, Rossi (1955), uncovers “place utility” factors as the main drivers of
migration decisions and these are pertinent even in the context of international
migration. These factors include assessments of social and physical characteristics
of the current place or country of residence, job opportunities, and access to public
services. These are similar to the quality of life factors as examined by Cebula
and Vedder (1973), Liu (1975), and Hsieh and Liu (1983). Rossi (1955) does not
limit himself only to identifying socio-psychological factors that increase migration
potential, but goes a step further and uses them to predict actual migration,
and verifies the predictions in a follow-up survey carried out eight months later.
He finds that most of the families intending to move had done so and an even
higher percentage of the families not intending to move remained in their old
neighborhoods. Thus, he finds that migration intentions strongly correlate with
actual patterns of migration or movements.
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In a review of five studies on intention to migrate conducted in different so-
cioeconomic contexts, Simmons (1986) finds that in four out of five studies that
conducted follow-up surveys, intentions to migrate or move were moderately strong
predictors of subsequent migration. These studies also utilize place-utility factors
as the main independent variables to assess the degree of migration intentions. He
argues that migrant intentions and motives provide a more complete understanding
of why people move, and therefore help us identify the policies which would have
to be implemented to modify the magnitude and/or direction of migration. In
a more recent study on international migration, Liebig and Sousa-Poza (2004)
use intention to migrate in their analysis and argue that using actual migration
data in analyzing behavioral linkages especially in the context of highly educated
individuals can be problematic due to certain inherent biases in the data such
as migration policies, migrant networks, proximity, and so on. As “intention to
migrate” is more pertinent to the incentives and disincentives that may lead to
actual migration, it is a good proxy to test the propensity to migrate. In this
chapter, I use satisfaction with education services, satisfaction with health services,
and confidence in institutions as additional control variables to capture any effect
that place-utility might have on intention to migrate abroad.
To operationalize subjective well-being, I use the question on life satisfaction
- “In general, how satisfied are you with your life?” Life satisfaction is measured
on a scale of 1 to 4 with value 1 representing “not at all satisfied” and value 4
representing “very satisfied”. The use of life satisfaction as against happiness
is justified by literature, which argues that life satisfaction is a cognitive and
judgmental state, which refers to an assessment of life as a whole. Essentially, life
satisfaction is a cognitive-evaluative concept in contrast with happiness, which is
thought of primarily as an affective concept reflecting positive feelings (Tsou and
Liu, 2001). Shin and Johnson (1978 as quoted in Diener et al. 1985) define life
satisfaction as “a global assessment of a person’s quality of life according to his
chosen criteria.” Diener (1984) terms life satisfaction as the hallmark of subjective
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well-being as it emphasizes an individual’s own judgments and is not externally
imposed. Some researchers such as Tatarkiewicz (1976 as quoted in Diener et
al. 1985) go as far as stating that “...happiness requires total satisfaction, that is
satisfaction with life as a whole”, thus making life satisfaction a pre-condition for
seeking happiness.
It is often argued that subjective well-being metrics such as life satisfaction are
confounded by moods and contexts leading to validity issues. Moods and contextual
factors such as a happy event or outcome of a game immediately prior to the
survey may profoundly affect questions on life satisfaction (Schwarz and Strack,
1999). Further, there is evidence from psychology that some people are intrinsically
happy and such personality traits systematically influence subjective well-being
(Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001). In addition, respondents are also often inclined to
answer subjective well-being questions such that they can avoid looking bad in
front of the interviewer (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). Particularly, questions
pertaining to negative feelings or depression are prone to such social desirability
bias. However, a growing literature on subjective well-being finds evidence that
considerable inter-personal convergence exists in the effects of pleasure, pain,
income, and unemployment on happiness and life satisfaction between individuals,
within countries as well as across countries, and across various subjective well-being
metrics thus strengthening the external validity of subjective well-being measures
(Frey and Stutzer, 2002; Di Tella and MacCulloch, 2006; Kahneman and Krueger,
2006; Diener et al., 2009; Helliwell and Barrington-Leigh, 2010).1 More recently,
panel data and quasi-experimental models using propensity scores and instrumental
variables are also being used to examine effects of specific independent variables
on subjective well-being measures and increase internal validity of the results
(Graham, Eggers, and Sukhtankar, 2004; Graham and Chaparro, 2011). The use
of repeated cross sections with fixed effects and a pseudo-panel as supplementary
1Diener et al. (2009) examine four subjective well-being surveys across 55 countries with a total
survey sample of 100,000 respondents and find that different subjective well-being metrics
and scales yield similar results across countries.
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analysis in this chapter are possible approaches to overcome the validity issues as
well as data limitations pertaining to subjective well-being.
Relative deprivation is operationalized using the economic ladder question (ELQ)
and computed using the approach followed by Stark and Yitzhaki (1988). ELQ is
used because the Latinobarometro does not gather information on actual income or
consumption. The ELQ asks respondents to place themselves on a 10-step ladder
where the poorest are on step one and the richest on step ten. It is therefore an
assessment of the respondents’ economic situation. Previous studies have found a
positive and statistically significant correlation between ELQ and income as well
as ELQ and consumption expenditure (Ravallion and Lokshin, 2001; Powdthavee,
2009). Further, ELQ has also been found to be a useful proxy for respondents’
views of their relative position in the absence of income data (Graham and Felton,
2006).2
Formally, Stark and Yitzhaki (1988) present the model for migration and relative
deprivation as follows. Let F (y) be the cumulative distribution of income. Then,
1−F (y) is the percentage of individuals whose income is higher than y. The feeling
of deprivation therefore is an increasing function of the percentage of individuals
who have income larger than y, that is, 1−F (y). Let h(1−F (y)) be the deprivation
from not having the higher or reference group income, that is, y+∆y. The total




h[1− F (z)] dz (1.2)
where ymax is the highest income in the reference group. Since the true reference
group is almost always unobservable, the relative deprivation function above can
be re-written as below for estimation purposes. If incomes are ranked from 1 to
ymax, then for any individual i with income yi, the degree of relative deprivation
is the percentage of persons richer or poorer than the individual times their mean
2Graham and Felton (2006) also use the Latinobarometro in their paper.
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excess income, that is,
RDi = [1− F (y)] E[ymax − yi] | ymax > yi (1.3)
An issue pertaining to relative deprivation is that of reference groups. There
is abundant evidence that when making relative assessments, people compare
themselves with a reference group composed of individuals having some common
characteristics such as place of residence, income category, age category, or ed-
ucation category. The Latinobarometro does not impose any reference group
nor asks questions eliciting responses on what the true reference group might be.
Therefore, the true reference group remains unobserved. Relevant reference group
may differ depending on the context and purpose of the study. Previous studies
have defined reference groups in many different ways. In investigating the effect of
relative income, relative deprivation, or relative status on subjective well-being,
reference groups have been defined based on broader geographic areas such as
country, state, city, or census tract (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004; Luttmer, 2005;
Helliwell and Huang, 2009; Graham and Felton, 2006). Knight et al. (2009) in
their paper on social comparisons in China identify village as the relevant reference
group. Fafchamps and Shilpi (2008) go a step further and identify immediate
neighbors within a village as the reference group. Reference groups have also been
defined based on age cohorts (Deaton and Paxson, 2001) and other demographic
characteristics such as region, age, gender, and education (Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 2005).
Graham and Felton (2006) find that effects of relative status are more pronounced
when the relevant reference group used is city of residence as compared to country
of residence. Thus, “social distance” is strongly associated with relative well-being.
In this analysis, I use each country as the reference group. The reference groups
could not be refined down to the district-level owing to differences in the sampling
frame across the waves.
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1.3.3 Empirical specification and descriptive statistics
I estimate variations of the following probit model using the RCS:
Migrate∗ikt = α0 + α1LSHighikt + α2Eduikt + α3LSikt ∗ Eduikt + α4RDHighikjt+
α5RDLowikjt +X
′
iktγ + α6Yt + α7Dk + α8Yt ∗Dk + εikt
(1.4)
where, the dependent variable is a dummy measuring the latent intention to
migrate for each individual i from country k in year t. LSHighikt is the dummy
for individuals reporting high life satisfaction, Eduikt is the individual education
level, and LSHighikt ∗ Eduikt is the interaction between high life satisfaction
and education level. LSHighikt equals 1 for those reporting life satisfaction of 3
and above on the 4-point scale and 0 otherwise. Life satisfaction is transformed
into a dummy variable to facilitate interpretation of the interaction between life
satisfaction and education.3 The top two rungs (3 and 4) are used to define high
life satisfaction based on mean life satisfaction, which is 2.957 for this sample (see
Table 1.1). RDHighikjt is the share of individuals within each reference group j
having higher ELQ than the individual respondent (in percentage) and RDLowikjt
is the share of individuals within each reference group j having lower ELQ than
the individual respondent (in percentage). X ′ikt represents additional control
variables such as distance from capital of United States, gender, age, marital status,
employment status, satisfaction with education services, satisfaction with health
services, confidence in institutions, future economic perspective of the country of
residence, and future economic perspective of self or prospects for upward mobility
(POUM). Confidence in institutions is disaggregated into confidence in public
institutions and confidence in private enterprises.4 Yt, Dk, and Yt ∗Dk are year,
3Models using interaction between life satisfaction and education both as continuous variables
were also estimated. The sign and significance of the interaction term coefficient remains the
same. Results are available upon request.
4Confidence in public institutions is constructed using Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
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country, and country-year interaction fixed effects respectively. The RCS analysis
is conducted using the sampling weights for each wave.5
Education levels and the interaction of education and high life satisfaction are
included to capture the effect of higher education as well as that of attaining higher
education and reporting high life satisfaction. Two separate relative deprivation
variables are included to capture both being relatively “better off” and relatively
“worse off”. For instance, if share with higher ELQ is 40 percent, it means that 40
percent of the individuals in the reference group are better-off as compared to the
individual respondent. Similarly, if share with lower ELQ is 20 percent, it means
that 20 percent of individuals in the reference group are worse-off as compared
to the individual respondent. A positive coefficient on share with higher ELQ
will be interpreted as increase in the percentage of individuals in the reference
group who are better-off than the individual respondent thus making the individual
respondent more worse-off. On the other hand, a positive coefficient on share with
lower ELQ will be interpreted as increase in the percentage of individuals in the
reference group who are worse-off than the individual respondent thus making the
individual respondent more better-off.
The distance variable is included to control for migration intentions driven
purely by proximity to a developed country. It is also included as a proxy to
control for migration due to networks in nearby developed countries or historical
linkages.6 Satisfaction with education services, satisfaction with health services,
and confidence in institutions measure place utility or quality of life. Confidence
in institutions is disaggregated into public and private institutions as the two are
likely to have different effects on life satisfaction and subsequently intention to
migrate. Dissatisfaction due to corruption and poor governance is captured by
and includes confidence in the Congress and confidence in political parties.
5As sampling design varied greatly by country and also by each wave, sampling design could
not be incorporated in the analysis.
6Distance to the capital of United States is specifically included because the 2004 Latino-
barometro asked respondents which country they thought of migrating to and the greatest
proportion, 42 percent, of potential migrants indicated that they intended to migrate to the
United States.
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confidence in public institutions while the expectation that private enterprises
promote growth is captured by confidence in private institutions. Future economic
perspective of the country of residence and POUM are included to control for effect
of the perceived opportunities provided by the country of residence and ambitions
or optimism, factors that are especially relevant to the “frustrated achievers”.7
Table 1.1 presents the summary statistics for the variables included in the RCS
models.
Table 1.1 – Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gender (Male=1, Female=0) 0.491 0.500 0.000 1.000 80271
Age 39.311 16.301 16.000 99.000 80271
Intending to migrate abroad 0.251 0.433 0.000 1.000 80271
Years of education 8.968 4.525 1.000 17.000 80271
Married 0.572 0.495 0.000 1.000 80271
Unemployed 0.058 0.234 0.000 1.000 80271
Distance to US capital 3525.938 1444.702 1168.870 5916.900 80271
Life satisfaction 2.957 0.859 1.000 4.000 80271
ELQ 4.246 1.778 1.000 10.000 80271
Satisfaction with quality of healthcare 2.588 0.928 1.000 4.000 80271
Satisfaction with quality of education 2.639 0.908 1.000 4.000 80271
Confidence in public institutions 0.000 1.000 -1.334 2.840 80271
Confidence in private institutions 2.411 0.900 1.000 4.000 80271
Prospects for upward mobility (POUM) 3.410 0.949 1.000 5.000 80271
Future economic perspective of country 3.010 1.075 1.000 5.000 80271
Notes: Estimates based on repeated cross-sections consisting of 80,271 observations. All
variables have been recoded such that lower values correspond to lower satisfaction, well-being,
or confidence and higher values correspond to higher satisfaction, well-being or confidence.
From Table 1.1 we can observe that 25 percent of the individuals responded
that they intend to migrate abroad. Mean individual life satisfaction is 2.957 on a
scale of 4, which is on the higher side. Mean individual ELQ is 4.246 on a scale
of 10.8 Mean individual education level is 9 years suggesting that there are fewer
7POUM captures the mobility that respondents expect in the near future. The question in
Latinobarometro asks respondents’ expectations regarding their personal economic situation
one year into the future.
8This resonates with previous literature which finds that individuals tend to cluster themselves
around the middle rungs of the ELQ and very few report very low or very high ELQ (Ravallion
and Lokshin, 2000)
15
individuals with college and higher level of education in the sample.
Table 1.2 depicts the life satisfaction levels by intention to migrate and being
highly educated. It clearly shows that those who intend to migrate have lower
mean life satisfaction as compared to those who do not. However, they report
higher levels of POUM indicating that they are more ambitious and optimistic, and
desire greater upward mobility. The findings are similar for those who are highly
educated. Highly educated individuals who intend to migrate report lower mean
levels of life satisfaction but higher mean POUM, which fits with the “frustrated
achievers” theory.
Previous studies have found that life satisfaction is correlated with relative
deprivation and place utility factors. Particularly, there is evidence that life
satisfaction is highly correlated with relative income or deprivation, satisfaction
with healthcare, and confidence in institutions (Clark and Oswald, 1996; Graham,
2008; Graham and Picon, 2009). To discern the effect of life satisfaction on intention
to migrate, I first run simple correlations between high life satisfaction and variables
included in the analysis. And second, I estimate bivariate regression models with
latent intention to migrate as the dependent variable and each independent variable
to determine whether variables that are highly correlated with life satisfaction are
significantly associated with intention to migrate abroad. The bivariate regression
analysis thus provides a sense of the independent variables that may be downward-
biasing the effects of life satisfaction in the multivariate regression models. From
Table 1.3 it is observed that reporting high life satisfaction is significantly correlated
with all variables included in the analysis. It is negatively correlated with intention
to migrate abroad. As expected, reporting high life satisfaction is negatively
correlated with share with higher ELQ (or being worse-off) and positively correlated
with share with lower ELQ (or being better-off). However, contrary to the expected
































































































































































































































Table 1.3 – Correlates of High Life Satisfaction
High Life Satisfaction Correlation Coefficient





Years of education 0.081***
Share with high ELQ -0.171***
Share with low ELQ 0.157***
Satisfaction with quality of healthcare 0.209***
Satisfaction with quality of education 0.205***
Confidence in public institutions 0.134***
Confidence in private institutions 0.095***
Prospects for upward mobility (POUM) 0.176***
Future economic perspective of country 0.158***
Notes: Estimates based on repeated cross-sections consisting of 80,271 observations. All
variables have been recoded such that lower values correspond to lower satisfaction,
well-being, or confidence and higher values correspond to higher satisfaction, well-being
or confidence.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 1.4 presents bivariate associations between intention to migrate abroad
and all the independent variables. It is observed that being highly satisfied has a
negative and significant association with intention to migrate. Share with higher
ELQ (or being worse-off) has a negative and significant association while share
with lower ELQ (or being better-off) has a positive and significant association with
intention to migrate. Among the place utility factors, satisfaction with healthcare
and confidence in public institutions have a negative and (marginally) significant
association, while confidence in private institutions has a positive and significant
association with intention to migrate. Somewhat surprisingly, POUM and future
economic perspective of the home country are not significantly associated with
intention to migrate abroad.
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Table 1.4 – Bivariate Associations between Intention to Migrate Abroad and Inde-
pendent Variables
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Coefficient S.E.
High life satisfaction -0.025*** 0.005
Years of education 0.015*** 0.001




Distance to US capital 0.000*** 0.000
Share with high ELQ -0.015*** 0.002
Share with low ELQ 0.015*** 0.002
Satisfaction with quality of healthcare -0.007* 0.004
Satisfaction with quality of education -0.002 0.005
Confidence in public institutions -0.013** 0.005
Confidence in private institutions 0.008** 0.003
Prospects for upward mobility (POUM) 0.008 0.006
Future economic perspective of country -0.007 0.005
Notes: Estimates based on repeated cross-sections consisting of 80,271 observations
using country, year, and country*year fixed effects. All variables have been recoded such
that lower values correspond to lower satisfaction, well-being, or confidence and higher
values correspond to higher satisfaction, well-being or confidence.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
1.4 Results
I begin with a simple hypothesis that higher education and lower life satisfaction
strengthen the intention to migrate abroad and for that I estimate a model that
controls for high life satisfaction dummy, education, background characteristics,
distance, and place utility variables - satisfaction with education services, sat-
isfaction with health services, and confidence in public and private institutions.
Here, place utility factors reflect the quality of life that the home country offers its
residents. From Table 1.5 it is observed that each additional year of education has
a statistically significant positive effect on intention to migrate abroad. Of interest
is the statistically significant negative effect of reporting high life satisfaction on
intention to migrate abroad suggesting that increasing the levels of life satisfac-
tion may weaken international migration intentions. Satisfaction with quality of
healthcare and confidence in public institutions highly statistically significantly
reduce the intention to migrate while confidence in private institutions increase
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the intention to migrate.
Table 1.5 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Effect of Education
and Place Utility
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects
High life satisfaction -0.044∗∗∗
(0.005)
Years of education 0.011∗∗∗
(0.001)
Satisfaction with quality of healthcare -0.006∗∗∗
(0.002)
Satisfaction with quality of education -0.003
(0.003)
Confidence in public institutions -0.015∗∗∗
(0.005)
Confidence in private institutions 0.010∗∗∗
(0.003)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.072
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, and distance to US capital.
I then posit a more refined hypothesis that even among those with higher
education, the ones reporting high life satisfaction are less likely to migrate abroad.
This essentially means that it is not education and life satisfaction separately, but
the interaction of education and life satisfaction that drives international migration
decisions. The model in Table 1.6 suggests that more educated individuals reporting
high life satisfaction are less inclined to migrate abroad as compared to more
educated individuals reporting low life satisfaction, and the effect is statistically
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significant.9
Table 1.6 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Interaction Effect
of Education and Life Satisfaction
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects
High life satisfaction -0.017
(0.013)
Years of education 0.013∗∗∗
(0.002)
High Life Satisfaction*Education -0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.072
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, distance to US capital, satisfaction with quality of healthcare,
satisfaction with quality of education, confidence in public institutions, and confidence
in private institutions.
The key hypothesis to be tested is that high life satisfaction significantly affects
international migration decisions even after controlling for relative deprivation,
especially of those who have higher education. This would explain whether as-
sessments of objective or subjective well-being or both are of greater significance
in driving migration decisions.10 The model in Table 1.7 controls for relative
deprivation, both the share of individuals with higher ELQ and lower ELQ. It
is observed having more individuals with higher ELQ (or being worse-off) has
9In simple terms, the interpretation of the interaction term is, ˆMigrateHighLifeSatisfaction =
CoefficientHighLifeSatisfaction + (CoefficientY earsofEducation +
CoefficientEduc∗HighLifeSatisfaction) ∗ Y earsofEducation
10It should be re-emphasized that in the absence of actual income data, ELQ provides the closest
assessment of objective or economic well-being.
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a statistically significant negative effect on intention to migrate abroad. This
is in line with previous evidence which suggests that those with fewer resources
are less likely to migrate abroad. However, having more individuals with lower
ELQ (or being better-off) has no significant effect on intention to migrate. Of
particular importance is the effect of the interaction of education and high life
satisfaction, which continues to be negative and statistically significant. Thus, life
satisfaction or subjective well-being concerns more generally do not cease to be
of significant concern for those with higher education even after controlling for
relative deprivation.
Table 1.7 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Effect of Relative
Deprivation
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects
High life satisfaction -0.019
(0.013)
Years of education 0.012∗∗∗
(0.002)
High Life Satisfaction*Education -0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Share with higher ELQ -0.006∗∗
(0.003)
Share with lower ELQ 0.002
(0.003)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.073
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, distance to US capital, satisfaction with quality of healthcare,
satisfaction with quality of education, confidence in public institutions, and confidence
in private institutions.
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It is likely that both life satisfaction and relative economic well-being have
a significant effect on the migration decisions of those with higher education
because they have higher aspirations or are more optimistic and are dissatisfied
with the opportunities that their home country offers. To test this, the model
in Table 1.8 controls for POUM and future economic perspective of the country.
Instead of including years of education, this model includes the higher education
dummy, which equals 1 for those with college and above level of education and 0
otherwise. The interaction of highly educated and high life satisfaction dummies
is included to explicitly determine whether highly educated individuals reporting
high life satisfaction are less likely to consider migrating abroad. It is observed
that similar to the interaction effect of years of education and high life satisfaction,
the interaction of being highly educated and having higher life satisfaction has a
statistically significant negative effect on intention to migrate. It is also observed
that having a more positive future economic perspective of the home country, that
is, perceiving the country as progressive, has a statistically significant negative
effect on intention to migrate abroad. However, having a more positive POUM,
that is, being more ambitious or optimistic, has no effect on intention to migrate
abroad. Thus, the effect of life satisfaction on migration intentions does not seem
to be confounded by POUM and I find no evidence to support the “frustrated
achievers” hypothesis.
1.4.1 Pseudo-panel results
A limitation of RCS is that it does not truly capture unobserved characteristics such
as changes in values, attitudes, and abilities over time that may drive migration
decisions because the same individuals are not observed. It is possible that those
who are highly educated are systematically different in terms of values, attitudes,
and abilities from those who are not, and this might directly impinge on their
migration decisions. To properly account for these differences in unobserved
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Table 1.8 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Effect of Ambitions
and Perceived Opportunities
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects




Highly Educated*High Life Satisfaction -0.051∗∗∗
(0.016)
Share with higher ELQ -0.005∗
(0.003)
Share with lower ELQ 0.005
(0.004)




Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.070
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, distance to US capital, satisfaction with quality of healthcare,
satisfaction with quality of education, confidence in public institutions, and confidence
in private institutions.
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characteristics, we would need panel data where we could control for individual
fixed effects and determine the effects of life satisfaction, education, and relative
deprivation more efficiently. Panel data are not available in the Latinobarometro
as the survey does not interview the same respondents every year. In the absence
of panel data, I adopt the approach proposed by Deaton (1985) and create a
pseudo-panel from repeated cross-sectional data by taking weighted-average values
of variables of interest over time-invariant characteristics such as year of birth, time
or period of survey, and gender and forming “cohorts”. This pseudo-panel, which
is essentially a time series of cohort averages, can be treated as an approximation
of a true panel.
The use of pseudo-panels has its own limitations. First, averaging over cohorts
eliminates individual heterogeneity such as differing values or abilities and does
not fully address the problem of unobserved characteristics. And second, loss
in variation due to aggregation might result in insignificant or unexpected coef-
ficients. This is particularly problematic when computing relative deprivation.
Hypothetically, if half the individuals in a cohort are in the bottom half of the
ELQ distribution and the other half are in the top half of the ELQ distribution,
then pseudo-panel averages out this variation rendering the relative deprivation
variable meaningless. Nevertheless, estimating pseudo-panel effects is a worthy
exercise as a supplement to the main RCS estimates and to confirm whether the
main effects of high life satisfaction on intention to migrate abroad continue to
hold.
I use country of birth, 10-year age-categories, and gender as the time-invariant
characteristics to create cohorts from each wave and then merge the waves to create
a four-year pseudo-panel. The cohort averages are computed using sampling weights
corresponding to each wave. To illustrate the use of pseudo-panel mathematically,
if the true panel model were:
yit = α + βxit + µi + νit (1.5)
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where, µi represents unobserved individual fixed effects that do not change over
time and νit represents unobserved effects that vary over both individuals and
time. However, in a pseudo-panel this model cannot be identified because each
individual is observed only once. Then, we can define C cohorts based on a set of
time-invariant characteristics Z, which are similar to the individual fixed effects.
The variables, both dependent and independent, are the cohort means (where the
original variable is continuous) or proportions (where the original variable is a
dummy). The pseudo-panel model can then be written as:
ȳct = x̄ctβ + µ̄ct + ν̄ct (1.6)
where, ȳct is the average of yit over all individuals belonging to cohort c at time
t. Unlike the true panel model, µ̄ct retains the t subscript to indicate that each
period’s cohort mean is calculated using a different set of individuals (Russell and
Fraas, 2005).
Because the variables in a pseudo-panel represent cohort means or proportions,
the dependent dummy variable “intention to migrate abroad” is transformed into
the proportion of individuals in each cohort who indicated that they intend to
migrate abroad; the dummy variable high life satisfaction represents proportion
reporting high life satisfaction in each cohort; and relative deprivation is computed
using mean cohort ELQ in each reference group, that is, the country. Similarly, other
independent variables have been transformed as either cohort means or proportions.
All means and proportions are computed taking into account sampling weights for
each wave of the dataset.
The empirical specification is a panel regression model with AR(1) errors.11 The
lagged errors are included to correct for first order serial autocorrelation that was
identified in the pseudo-panel and minimize the upward bias caused by the error
term. I estimate variations of the following empirical model:
11Fixed effects are not explicitly specified in the models because cohort fixed effects are captured
by the time invariant characteristics - country, gender, and age categories - used to define the
cohorts.
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Migratect = β0 + β1LSHighct + β2Educt + β3LSct ∗ Educt + β4RDHighcjt
+β5RDLowcjt + X̄ ′ctγ + εct
(1.7)
where, c represents each cohort at time t. Migratect is the dependent variable
measuring the proportion of individuals in each cohort who intend to migrate abroad;
LSHighct is the proportion of individuals in each cohort with high life satisfaction
(above 3 on the 4-point scale); Educt is the mean education level; LSHigh∗Educt is
the interaction between high life satisfaction and mean education level; RDHighcjt
is the share of cohorts having higher ELQ within each reference group j than
the individual cohort; RDLowcjt is the share of cohorts having lower ELQ within
each reference group j than the individual cohort; and X̄ ′ct represents additional
control variables similar to the repeated cross-section analysis. Table 1.9 presents
the summary statistics. It is observed that the standard deviations for continuous
variables are lower than they were for the RCS highlighting the loss in variation.
We see that 23 percent of cohorts responded that they intend to migrate abroad.
Mean cohort life satisfaction is 2.943, mean cohort ELQ is 4.131, and mean cohort
education level is 8 years.
Table 1.10 presents the full model that controls for place utility factors, education-
life satisfaction interaction term, relative deprivation, and POUM. It is observed
that while the interaction effect of being highly educated and reporting high life
satisfaction remains negative and statistically significant, the coefficients on other
independent variables are not consistent with the RCS estimates. As previously
mentioned, this might be due to the loss of individual heterogeneity and overall
variation.
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Table 1.9 – Summary statistics - Pseudo panel
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gender 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000 720
Age category 3.000 1.415 1.000 5.000 720
Proportion intending to migrate abroad 0.234 0.122 0.014 0.793 720
Years of education 8.180 2.431 2.041 12.761 720
Married 0.584 0.192 0.048 0.958 720
Unemployed 0.057 0.041 0.000 0.280 720
Distance to US capital 3455.662 1437.922 1168.870 5916.900 720
Life satisfaction 2.943 0.285 2.052 3.650 720
ELQ 4.131 0.642 1.886 5.433 720
Satisfaction with quality of healthcare 2.577 0.281 1.671 3.208 720
Satisfaction with quality of education 2.622 0.270 1.844 3.355 720
Confidence in public institutions 0.000 1.000 -2.848 2.891 720
Confidence in private institutions 2.412 0.318 1.596 3.356 720
Prospects for upward mobility (POUM) 3.359 0.326 2.285 4.123 720
Future economic perspective of country 2.977 0.390 1.864 4.009 720
Notes: Estimates based on pseudo-panel consisting of 720 cohorts constructed using country,
10-year age categories, and gender. All variables have been recoded such that lower values
correspond to lower satisfaction, well-being, or confidence and higher values correspond to higher
satisfaction, well-being or confidence
1.5 Drivers of intention to migrate abroad
The results find evidence to support that life satisfaction is a significant driver
of intention to migrate abroad. First, though reporting high life satisfaction
weakens the intention to migrate, it is the interaction effect of high life satisfaction
and education that has a consistent statistically significant negative effect on
intention to migrate. This effect is robust to the inclusion of average years of
education or including the dummy for highly educated individuals. Among the
place utility factors that reflect quality of life, confidence in public institutions
or how much “trust in the government” individuals place, emerges as a factor
that significantly reduces intention to migrate abroad. Indeed, Graham and Picon
(2009) argue that policies promoted by political institutions directly impinge on the
life satisfaction of individuals with higher prospects of upward mobility. They find
that in Latin America promotion of democracy is an institutional intervention that
is of particular importance to the educated and upwardly mobile individuals. Thus,
higher confidence in public institutions may weaken migration intentions because of
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Table 1.10 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Pseudo-panel
Estimates for the Highly Educated
Dependent Variable: Proportion Intending to Migrate Abroad Panel AR(1)




Highly Educated*High Life Satisfaction -1.704∗∗∗
(0.455)
Satisfaction with quality of healthcare 0.032
(0.026)
Satisfaction with quality of education 0.010
(0.027)
Confidence in public institutions 0.004
(0.006)
Confidence in private institutions -0.008
(0.012)
Share with higher ELQ 0.040
(0.035)
Share with lower ELQ 0.094***
(0.033)






Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Panel estimates based on a pseudo-panel of 720 cohorts across four waves. Robust standard
errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is proportion of observations in each cohort intending
to migrate abroad. Additional controls include country, gender, age, marital status, employment
status and distance to US capital.
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its positive correlation with life satisfaction. Another place utility factor that has
a significant negative effect on intention to migrate abroad is satisfaction with the
quality of healthcare. Again, this may be because health status and satisfaction
with healthcare are highly correlated with happiness (or life satisfaction) across
countries and regions as has been found by Graham (2008).
Similar to relative income or deprivation, an argument made by Veenhoven
(1991) and Graham (2011) is that life satisfaction or happiness is also relative. For
instance, living in a neighborhood where the mean level of life satisfaction is high
has a positive effect on the life satisfaction of the individual. To empirically test
whether relative life satisfaction affects intention to migrate abroad in the sample
under study, I run a model with “share who are more satisfied”. I compute share
of individuals in each reference group who have a higher than mean level of life
satisfaction using the original 4-point life satisfaction variable. The results in Table
1.11 show that relative life satisfaction has a statistically significant negative effect
on intention to migrate. This suggests that if the mean life satisfaction levels are
high then there is a “spillover positive effect” on the entire reference group and
that is likely to weaken the intention to migrate abroad. This further buttresses
the effect that increased life satisfaction has on reducing migration intentions.
Second, contrary to the expectation that inclusion of relative deprivation might
significantly weaken the effect of life satisfaction for the highly educated, the results
reveal that even after controlling for relative deprivation the negative effect of the
high life satisfaction and education interaction term continues to be statistically
significant. Being worse-off has a significant negative effect on intention to migrate
thus corroborating previous empirical evidence. However, I find no significant effect
of being better-off on intention to migrate. A further robustness check is done
to confirm the results of relative deprivation and the life satisfaction-education
interaction term by computing relative deprivation using the income sufficiency
question, which asks the respondent “Does the salary that you receive and your total
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Table 1.11 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Robustness Check
with Relative Life Satisfaction
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects




Share with higher ELQ -0.005∗
(0.003)
Share with lower ELQ 0.004
(0.004)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.069
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, distance to US capital, satisfaction with quality of healthcare,
satisfaction with quality of education, confidence in public institutions, confidence in
private institutions, future economic perspective of country, and POUM.
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family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner?” A score
of 1 corresponds to very insufficient and a score of 4 corresponds to very sufficient
income. From Table 1.12 it is observed that the effect on the life satisfaction-
education interaction term remains negative and statistically significant and is
therefore robust to the revised relative deprivation. However, neither relative
deprivation variable is significant.
Table 1.12 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Robustness Check
with Relative Subjective Income
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects




Highly Educated*High Life Satisfaction -0.046∗∗∗
(0.013)
Share with higher subjective income 0.000
(0.008)
Share with lower subjective income 0.005
(0.009)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.067
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, distance to US capital, satisfaction with quality of healthcare,
satisfaction with quality of education, confidence in public institutions, confidence in
private institutions, future economic perspective of country, and POUM.
And third, I find that the international migration intentions of the highly
educated are driven by the economic outlook of the home country. Having a
positive future economic outlook of the home country weakens the intention to
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migrate abroad, controlling for life satisfaction and relative deprivation. Contrary
to the expectation, I find no significant relationship between having high POUM
and intention to migrate abroad, and therefore cannot support the hypothesis that
“frustrated achievers” are more likely to consider migrating abroad. To test whether
other factors capturing ambitions and frustrations might be significantly associated
with migration intentions, I run the full model with two additional variables which
ask whether lack of opportunities for the youth is a problem facing their home
country and whether low wages is a problem facing their home country. Both,
the perception that the home country will likely not provide the opportunities to
achieve the expected economic mobility and persistent low wages, should have a
positive effect on intention to migrate abroad. Results presented in Table 1.13
find that low paying jobs has a statistically significant positive effect on intention
to migrate while the perception about lack of opportunities for the youth has no
significant effect, controlling for life satisfaction and relative deprivation. Thus,
economic perception of the home country seems to underlie the frustrations of the
highly educated rather than personal ambitions or optimism.
1.6 Conclusion
This chapter is a first account providing empirical evidence on the relationship
between subjective well-being and international migration intentions. Building
upon existing theories of subjective well-being, relative deprivation, and migration
I find evidence to support that life satisfaction is a significant driver of international
migration intentions, especially for the highly educated. Specifically, educated
individuals reporting high life satisfaction are significantly less likely to migrate
as compared to educated individuals reporting low life satisfaction controlling
for relative deprivation and place utility factors. This key finding is robust to
several different specifications including supplementary analysis conducted using a
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Table 1.13 – Life Satisfaction and Intention to Migrate Abroad - Further Tests for
Frustrated Achievers
Dependent Variable: Intention to Migrate Abroad Probit Marginal Effects




Highly Educated*High Life Satisfaction -0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Share with higher ELQ -0.003
(0.003)
Share with lower ELQ 0.004
(0.004)
Low paying jobs is a problem 0.026∗∗
(0.013)
Opportunities for youth is a problem 0.038
(0.043)
Year fixed effects Yes
Country fixed effects Yes
Country*Year fixed effects Yes
Observations 80271
Pseudo−R2 0.074
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes:
Estimates are average marginal effects from probit regressions estimated using repeated
cross-sections consisting of 80,271 individuals across four waves. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy indicating whether the individual
intended to migrate or not. Additional controls include gender, age, marital status,
employment status, distance to US capital, satisfaction with quality of healthcare,
satisfaction with quality of education, confidence in public institutions, confidence in
private institutions, future economic perspective of country, and POUM.
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pseudo-panel.
It would be audacious to recommend a single policy tool that will increase
life satisfaction of potential migrants and prevent subsequent migration. This is
because several factors mediate the effect of life satisfaction as was observed in the
correlation and bivariate analysis. Further research using panel data would allow
to test the effect of life satisfaction and unobserved heterogeneities more efficiently.
The key takeaway here is that the significant negative effect of life satisfaction on
migration intentions of the highly educated sheds light on an alternative explanation
to potential migration beyond that of the economic motive.
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Chapter 2
Does being a recipient of poverty alleviation programs affect perceived
economic well-being?
2.1 Introduction
Poverty alleviation remains one of the biggest development challenges and is at
the crux of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Programs aimed at
alleviating poverty have traditionally been classified as livelihood protecting or
livelihood promoting (Devereux, 2002). While the discourse on poverty is shifting
away from purely income-based measures towards multidimensional poverty that
combines both objective and subjective factors, there is very little empirical
research undertaken to assess the effects of poverty alleviation programs on the
subjective dimensions of poverty. This chapter engages in this empirical inquiry by
contrasting the effects of two of the most widely implemented poverty alleviation
strategies falling in the respective categories, that is, social transfers (livelihood
protection) and microfinance (livelihood promotion). Social transfers comprises of
direct transfer to beneficiaries either in cash or in kind to eligible households with
the primary aim of overcoming periods of economic shocks, providing essential
commodities such as food, or supplementing income to reduce vulnerability and
prevent families from falling into persistent poverty. Microfinance on the other hand
comprises of small loans aimed at promoting livelihoods and creating self-reliance
among the poor and low-income individuals with the assumption that the credit is
spent towards productive purposes that will generate incremental and sustainable
36
income.
Two questions arise with regards to the objectives of this chapter. First, what
is the objective behind contrasting the two poverty alleviation programs, which
are very different in their design? And second, why is the effect of these programs
on perceived or subjective well-being relevant? The answer to the first question
is the policy implication that such an assessment might have on the choice of
poverty alleviation programs that are implemented. From a policy perspective it
is not only important to gauge the take-up rates of poverty alleviation programs,
but also what programs can achieve the greatest and most sustainable impact
without creating a cycle of dependency. Therefore, the underlying objective is
to investigate whether it is livelihood protection or livelihood promotion that
has a greater positive impact on subjective and objective economic well-being.
Social transfers programs are being used to represent the policy options aimed at
livelihood protection and microfinance is being used to represent policy options
aimed at livelihood promotion and self-reliance.
To answer the second question, there is evidence that being a long-term recipient
of social transfers is associated with a phenomenon called “welfare stigma”, which
generates feelings of lack of self-respect and negative evaluations among welfare
recipients, and that this has a direct bearing on program take-up rates (Horan
and Austin, 1974; Moffitt, 1983; Wong and Lou, 2010). Limited evidence on the
negative impact of microfinance on household income suggests that microfinance
has the potential to push poor households into a cycle of indebtedness (Hashemi,
2007; Karnani, 2007; Khan, 2009). Therefore, it can be argued that microfinance
can also have a likely negative effect on perceived well-being. Second, there is
evidence from qualitative studies on poverty that the poor are conscious of both
their objective and subjective dimensions of well-being and make assessments of
programs, institutions, and governance based on the impact they have on the two
dimensions (Narayan et al., 2000). Therefore, poor and low-income households do
not always assess their well-being based solely on income or consumption. And
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third, I argue that there is also a normative rationale for subjective assessment
of these programs. I posit that subjective well-being gives us better insight into
the kind of lives and the things that are “valued” by the poor and whether these
programs enable them to attain or gain those. Assessments examining subjective
well-being can therefore better bring out the discrepancy between expectation and
actual achievement (Masud Ahmed et al., 2001). Households can value in-kind
social transfers programs for the safety-net that they provide in preventing families
from being under-nourished, while they can value receiving microfinance because
of the possible “agency” that they generate through skills acquisition, investment
in human capital, and ownership of a microenterprise.1
To achieve these research objectives, I examine the effects of receiving in-kind
social transfers and microfinance programs on objective and subjective economic
well-being using the 2004 Peru Poverty Assessment Tools Survey conducted by the
IRIS Center at the University of Maryland. The specific research question I ask is -
Does being a recipient of and length of receiving “livelihood promoting” microfinance
and “livelihood protecting” social transfers affect subjective and objective economic
well-being differently? The chapter aims to contribute to literature on assessment
of poverty alleviation programs as well as on subjective economic well-being more
broadly. Specifically, I test not only the effects of being a mere recipient but also
the effects of length of receiving poverty alleviation program benefits on objective
and subjective economic well-being. Further, I test whether the “being poor feeling
poorer” phenomenon exists among recipients of livelihood protecting programs
and whether particularly positive effects on subjective economic well-being result
from being recipients of livelihood promoting and self-reliance generating programs.
The key findings of this chapter are that households value livelihood promotion
and self-reliance. I also find that being a recipient of in-kind social transfers can
cause “welfare stigma” but the effect is not significant for households that are
very poor. In addition, I find that livelihood promoting programs can lead to
1The terminologies “value” and “agency” have been adapted from Sen’s (1999) capability
approach.
38
positive investment in human capital development, which is in line with findings
from previous evaluations of microfinance programs.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 presents a brief review of
literature on perceived economic well-being and the effects of social transfers and
microfinance on perceived economic well-being. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical
strategy, data, and summary statistics. Section 2.4 presents the results. Section
2.5 discusses the effects of being a recipient of poverty alleviation programs on
subjective and objective economic well-being. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Review of literature
2.2.1 Subjective or self-rated economic well-being
The concept of subjective or self-rated economic well-being emerged from the
interpretations of the Easterlin Paradox, which argues that aggregate subjective
well-being responds weakly to increase in per capita income.2 Subjective economic
well-being can be thought of as examining only the “economic” or “income” domain
from the set of domains that an individual considers valuable. Instead of viewing
subjective economic well-being as a concept competing with income or objective
poverty, Kingdon and Knight (2006), think of it as an encompassing concept that
permits quantification of other relevant and important well-being approaches such
as “capabilities”. They further argue that the concept of poverty itself requires
value judgments as to “what constitutes a good life or a bad one” and individual’s
own perception of their economic well-being captures that better than income or
consumption. In their study using data on South Africa, Kingdon and Knight
(2006) find a positive correlation of 0.358 between income and subjective economic
well-being.
Three popular approaches can be identified in the measurement of subjective
2Recent evidence finds that there is no satiation point beyond which rising incomes have no
further increases in subjective well-being (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008). However, this is
beyond the purview of this analysis.
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or self-rated economic well-being. First is the minimum income question (MIQ),
whose objective is to evaluate overall perceived income adequacy of the household
(Kapteyn et al. 1988 as quoted in Pradhan and Ravallion, 2000). The question
that Kapteyn et al. posed is “What income level do you personally consider to be
absolutely minimal? That is to say that with less you could not make ends meet.”
Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) raise objections to the validity of MIQ and argue
that the MIQ assumes that a household responding to the question is fully aware
of its income level. For instance, some households may fail to account for non-cash
income, bringing down the income level significantly. This they argue is of great
concern in developing countries and especially in the rural areas. They therefore
propose another measure of subjective economic well-being, which is the second
approach reviewed here.
Pradhan and Ravallion (2000) developed a set of qualitative questions on con-
sumption adequacy. The questions were as follows - “I would like to ask your
opinion of your family’s standard of living: (i) Concerning your family’s food
consumption over the past one month, which of the following is true? (ii) Concern-
ing your family’s housing, which of the following is true? (iii) Concerning your
family’s clothing, which of the following is true? (iv) Concerning the health care
your family gets, which of the following is true? (v) Concerning your children’s
schooling, which of the following is true?” For each of the questions, respondents
were given the following choices and told that “adequate” means no more nor less
than what the respondent considers to be the minimum consumption needs of
the family: (1) It was less than adequate for your family’s needs (2) It was just
adequate for your family’s needs (3) It was more than adequate for your family’s
needs (4) Not applicable. From the fielding of the consumption adequacy questions
in Jamaica and Nepal they find that their subjective economic well-being line is
more closely correlated with the income poverty line and also robust whether they
use a single food adequacy question or use the full set of questions.
The third and most widely used approach is the economic ladder question
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(ELQ) where respondents are asked to imagine a 10-step ladder with the bottom
step representing the ‘most poor’ and the top step representing the ‘most rich’.
Respondents are asked which step they feel they stand on in the present (Ravallion
and Lokshin, 2001). Some surveys also ask respondents where on the ladder they
would place themselves a few years ago or few years into the future. Using data
from Russia, Ravallion and Lokshin (2001) classify the income measure such that
the income categories have the same number of individuals in them as in the
categories of the ELQ, and assess the accordance between the measures. They find
the correlation between subjective and objective economic well-being to be very
weak. However, they argue that the results may be insubstantial due to potential
sources of bias and measurement errors.
Issues of reliability and validity remain a concern in subjective well-being studies.
Reliability and validity issues in responses to subjective economic well-being
questions may arise due to sensitivity to moods and contextual influences (generally
the unobserved confounding factors), personality, social desirability, question
wording, question ordering bias, and most importantly adaptation (Sen, 1999;
Schwarz and Strack, 1999; Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001; Ravallion and Lokshin,
2001).3 Though these validity issues complicate econometric analysis they can be
overcome by using multivariate regression models and panel data (Graham, 2005).
More recently, quasi-experimental models using propensity scores and instrumental
variables are also being used to examine effects of specific independent variables
on subjective well-being measures and increase internal validity of the results
(Graham and Chaparro, 2011). This chapter uses both non-experimental and
quasi-experimental approach to enable a comparison and robustness check of the
results.
3Sen (1999) argues that people adapt to poverty and inequality and therefore subjective
assessments might be biased.
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2.2.2 Poverty alleviation programs and subjective economic
well-being
A phenomenon closely associated with receiving and length of being a recipient
of social transfers or welfare programs is that of “welfare stigma”. The term first
emerged from qualitative sociological literature seeking explanation for the feelings
of lack of self-respect and negative evaluations among social transfers recipients. In
a qualitative study of 50 female AFDC recipients, Horan and Austin (1974) focus
on two aspects of stigma - whether they were bothered about being a recipient of
AFDC and whether they felt ashamed of being a recipient of AFDC. They find
that the longer the individual has been a recipient of AFDC or the more educated
the recipient is, the more stigmatized she feels. In a recent study, Wong and
Lou (2010) conduct in-depth interviews with 19 recipients of the Comprehensive
Social Security Assistance (CSSA) in Hong Kong. They examine the recipients’
aspiration for self-reliance, fulfillment of needs, and entry or exit decision-making.
Of methodological importance is the use of a life satisfaction scale to capture
aspiration for self-reliance and fulfillment of needs. Wong and Lou find high levels
of negative emotions among the CSSA recipients though most of them express
gratefulness towards the government for providing a safety net in times of distress.
They argue that the life satisfaction scale was introduced specifically to capture the
two different emotional states - negative feelings for receiving or being a long-term
recipient of CSSA and positive feelings for the compensation provided. Further,
low life satisfaction among recipients also reveals their aspirations to exit from the
CSSA.
Moffitt (1983) models welfare stigma as a utility function where stigma is
conceptualized as the disutility arising from being on welfare. In his model, welfare
stigma is either a flat component that arises from merely receiving social transfers
or it is a variable component that varies with the size of the benefit. Using the 1976
wave of the MPSID he finds that welfare stigma or disutility arises mainly from
the act of receiving welfare per se, that is, the flat component, and does not vary
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significantly with the amount of benefit once the individual is on welfare. However,
the probability of take-up, that is the decision to enter the social transfers program
varies significantly with the size of the potential benefit.
Though not extensive, there is some research on the psychological impact of being
a social transfers recipient. A study by Byrne et al. (1998) examines the 12-month
prevalence of depressive disorder and its relation to previous use of social assistance
among sole-support parents receiving social assistance in Ontario, Canada. Length
of being a recipient was measured as lifetime use of social assistance in months
multiplied by the dollar value of the benefit per month. In addition, they tally the
number of previous applications for social assistance. After controlling for poverty,
marital status, and gender, they find that the 12-month prevalence of depressive
disorder among sole-support parents receiving social assistance, 96.7 percent of
whom were women, is 45.4 percent as compared to 5 percent among mothers in
two-parent families. They conclude that poverty and being a long-term recipient
of social transfers is associated with depression, though not uniformly. Further,
they conclude that social policy should combine strategies such as skills training
for those receiving welfare with proactive mental health care to enable them to
cope with and move out of their poor economic situation. Specifically from a
subjective economic well-being perspective, Carletto and Zezza (2006) observe a
“being poor, feeling poorer” phenomenon among households who are receive social
transfers. Though it is not the focus of their study, Carletto and Zezza, using the
2002 Albania Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS), find evidence to
support that “being vulnerable”, such as relying on pensions for the majority of
one’s income, has a negative impact on perceived economic well-being.
Recently, though the impact of microfinance on poverty reduction has become a
highly debated issue, there is little empirical evidence on the impact of microfinance
on subjective economic well-being. The most serious negative consequence of
microfinance is its potential to push households into a cycle of indebtedness, which
may likely affect their subjective economic well-being. Indebtedness also implies
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increased dependency on loans, where households repeatedly borrow to pay-off
previous debts from multiple microfinance institutions or moneylenders. The
reasons found in the literature for pushing the poor into microfinance indebtedness
are lack of entrepreneurial skills and training leading to failure of the microenterprise;
lack of information and incentives to save; and use of microfinance for consumption
purposes such as weddings, funerals, and medical emergencies (Hashemi, 2007;
Karnani, 2007; Khan, 2009).
A study conducted using data on microfinance programs in Bangladesh finds
that receiving microfinance loans improves both objective and subjective economic
well-being in the short-run. However, this impact levels off after about 6 years
of receiving loans and after 8 years of receiving loans the poverty rates among
the recipients based on objective and subjective measures increased as compared
to previous estimates (Chowdhury et al., 2005). Another study conducted in
Bangladesh among women recipients of a microfinance program run by BRAC finds
that nearly 2 years of receiving microfinance loans failed to show any favorable
effect on the emotional well-being of poor women (Masud Ahmed et al., 2001).
Thus, the long-run effect of microfinance on subjective economic well-being is
uncertain.
2.2.3 Poverty alleviation programs: The Peru context
As the analysis draws upon household data from Peru, it is important to get an
understanding of the impact of poverty alleviation programs in Peru. In-kind
social transfer programs have been implemented in Peru since the 1980s with
“Vaso de Leche” (or Glass of Milk), a food aid program, being the largest social
transfer program in the country (Copestake, 2008; Stifel and Alderman, 2006).
There is some literature on the effect of Vaso de Leche and similar food aid
programs on objective outcomes such as food consumption and nutritional status,
and subjective outcomes such as feelings of inferiority. Laderchi (2001) finds that
food aid programs in Peru increase food consumption and expenditure but have
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no significant effect on child nutrition. Using qualitative evidence, Copestake
(2008) finds that recipients of Vaso de Leche do not feel inferior as compared
to non-recipients and that there is positive agreement among recipients that the
program is good for the community. Further, when asked what they like most about
the program, a large majority responded “getting food” suggesting that material
benefits of the program are of primary concern. Conditional cash transfers in Peru
are more recent with “Juntos” being implemented since 2005 (Jones et al., 2008).
Using qualitative evidence, Jones et al. (2008) find that there is a general consensus
among Juntos recipients that the program is making “a positive difference to their
lives”. Further, because the cash transfers were given to mothers, many of the
recipients responded that the program has increased their bargaining power within
the household. Impact evaluation of Juntos on objective well-being suggests that
the program has a moderate impact on increasing income and consumption (Perova
and Vakis, 2009). In addition, the program also has a positive impact on utilization
of health services, nutritional intake, and school enrollment and completion. Thus,
negative perceptions of well-being are not observed among the recipients of Vaso
de Leche and Juntos, who are among the poorest households.
Microfinance institutions emerged in Peru in the 1970s and since then have had a
significant presence (Pait, 2009). While there is no study that specifically examines
impact of microfinance on subjective economic well-being in the context of Peru,
a study by Dunn (1999) examines the impact of being a microfinance recipient
and microentrepreneur on feelings of self-esteem and respect as part of a broader
impact assessment. The study finds that of all the microfinance clients surveyed,
96.4 percent feel that they were making a significant contribution towards the
economic condition of their household as compared to 93.3 percent of all non-clients.
Further, 87.1 percent of all microfinance clients feel that they were valued by other
household members because of being microentrepreneurs as compared to 79.9
percent of all non-clients. In addition, the study also asks clients and non-clients
whether they feel optimistic about dealing with the future and finds that 82.4
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percent of all microfinance clients feel that they are in a good position to deal
with the future as compared to 71.3 percent of all non-clients. With regards to
impact on consumption, client households spend 20 percent more on education
as compared to non-client households, and spend $11 more on food every two
weeks as compared to non-client households. Using a randomized control trial
on microfinance recipients of FINCA-Peru, Karlan and Valdivia (2011) find that
adding business development training to the lending program has no significant
effect on revenues or profits of the recipients. However, it has a positive effect on
client retention from which the authors infer that recipients place a high value on
business development training because it may improve their business outcomes
and repayment capability.
2.3 Data and empirical strategy
2.3.1 Data and key variables
This study uses data from the 2004 Peru Poverty Assessment Tool (PAT) collected
by the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland. The advantage of using the Peru
PAT is that it was developed specifically for assessing the poverty status of social
transfers, microfinance, and microenterprise funds beneficiaries. The salient feature
of this survey is that it is a country-specific tool that takes into consideration
national poverty definitions and poverty lines. Therefore, it is more accurate than
surveys that contain information on multiple countries and yield country-level
poverty estimates. The 2004 Peru PAT contains data on 1,975 households.
The key dependent variables are subjective and objective economic well-being
and the key independent variable is being a program recipient. Subjective economic
well-being is measured using the 10-step Economic Ladder Question (ELQ). The
ELQ asks respondents “Imagine that at the bottom, on the first step, stand the
poorest people, and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the rich. On which step
of this ladder is your household located today?” Rungs 6-10 have been collapsed
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into one rung as very few individuals placed themselves on those rungs.4 The PAT
does not ask questions directly on household incomes. Therefore, the sum of key
consumption expenditures such as food, education, health, fuel, transport, and
utilities is used as a proxy to operationalize objective economic well-being. For
social transfers programs, I use a dummy that identifies whether the household
has been a recipient of any of the government in-kind social transfers programs
specified in the survey. It may be argued that cash transfer programs would provide
better insights when compared to microfinance programs. However, due to lack of
such data in the survey I use in-kind social transfers programs and examine the
effect on household consumption expenditures as it is more directly affected by
such programs. The programs covered in the survey are food aid related. Most
of the households reported that they were recipients of Vaso de Leche, Desayuno
and Almuerzo Escolar, and food-for-work programs. Length of being a program
recipient is operationalized using the “total-time-on” (TTO) measure (Gottschalk
and Moffitt, 1994). Length of being a social transfers recipient is measured using
TTO over the last three years (36 months) as that is the maximum recall period
covered by the survey.
Coverage of only food and nutrition-related social transfers in the survey is a
limitation of this analysis as the effect of cash transfers on well-being measures
could be very different. However, the use of in-kind social transfers for the purpose
of analysis can be justified. Some common concerns pertaining to in-kind and
cash transfers programs are changes in household labor market behavior that
subsequently affects household income or consumption (Laderchi, 2001). Copestake
(2008) in his qualitative evaluation of Vaso de Leche asked recipients whether
they would prefer cash instead of in-kind disbursement. He finds that of the 95
recipients interviewed, 58 opted for in-kind transfers, 19 said they would prefer
cash equivalent to the quantity of food, and 18 said either would be equally good.
Even accounting for the commonalities and preferences, the effect of cash and
4This follows the methodology used by Carletto and Zezza (2006).
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in-kind programs may still vary. However, in the absence of comprehensive data
on programs and well-being measures in a single household survey, this is the best
way forward.
Microfinance program recipients are identified by a dummy indicating whether the
household has any members who receive loans from government or non-government
microfinance programs at the time of the survey. Similar to social transfers, I use
time since household is a microfinance recipient to measure length of participation
in a microfinance program. I argue that being a long-term recipient of social
transfers is systematically different from being a long-term recipient of microfinance
because of positive temporal effects of receiving microfinance such as increased
creditworthiness and stronger social relations. In addition to length of being a
recipient, I use a dummy variable indicating whether the MFI loan was tied to a
business development service (BDS) to capture self-reliance.
The unit of analysis is the household as the well-being questions are asked at
the household-level. It is therefore not possible to tease out the effects on different
members of the household, especially men versus women. However, I control for
gender, age, and literacy of the household head to account for possible differences.
2.3.2 Baseline specification
To evaluate the impact of being a poverty alleviation program recipient and
length of being a recipient on subjective economic well-being I treat the recoded
6-step ELQ as a continuous variable and estimate variations of the following OLS
regression specification.5
5The specifications were also run using ordinal logit models and the key results remained the
same. Results are available upon request.
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SubjEcoWBi = β0 + β1Programi + β2ProgramLongTermi + β3BusDevi+
β4V eryPoori + β5Programi ∗ V eryPoori + βnWni + εi
(2.1)
where, the dependent variable is the self-reported subjective economic well-being
with higher values corresponding to being subjectively better-off. Programi is a
dummy that refers to the household being a recipient of social transfers or being a
member of a MFI. ProgramLongTermi is a dummy that classifies the household as
a long-term recipient of either social transfers or microfinance if they received social
transfers for more than 12 months of the 36 months captured in the questionnaire
or if they participated in a microfinance program for more than 4 years. These
cut-off points are based purely on the sample means and may not fully capture
actual long-term recipients. However, in the absence of longer recall periods in the
survey and panel data, this is the best way forward. BusDevi refers specifically to
households who are members of MFI and have received some BDS from the MFI
such as training and knowledge sharing.
V eryPoori is a dummy that identifies the poverty status of the household based
on household living standards (HLS) such as the building material used, whether the
household has electricity, whether the household has a toilet and so on. The survey
classifies households into five HLS quintiles with the first quintile representing the
poorest and the fifth quintile representing the richest. The HLS variable is the
interviewer’s assessment and is relative, that is, the survey imposes the community
being surveyed as the reference group when classifying the households in HLS
quintiles. I use the bottom two quintiles to identify households that are “very
poor”. The interaction term Programi∗V eryPoori is included to examine whether
the effect of being a program recipient on the very poor is different from the effect
on the relatively less poor households. The hypothesis is that the effect of poverty
alleviation programs on the very poor is systematically different from those who
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are not because of targeting and program objectives. For instance, social transfers
programs might extensively target the very poor while microfinance programs
might filter the risky and very poor to avoid bad debts.
βn is the vector of n factors that possibly contribute to subjective economic
well-being and includes whether the household resides in a rural or urban area,
age of household head, whether the head of the household is literate (can read
and write), whether the head of the household is married, whether the head of the
household is female, size of the household, and whether the head of the household
is unemployed.
To evaluate the impact of being a poverty alleviation program recipient and length
of being a recipient on consumption or objective well-being, I estimate variations
of the following OLS regression specification. The dependent variable measures
log of consumption for each household i with higher values corresponding to the
household being more objectively better-off. All regression analyses incorporate
the sampling weights and design.
Ln(Consumptioni) = β0 + β1Programi + β2ProgramLongTermi + β3BusDevi+
β4V eryPoori + β5Programi ∗ V eryPoori + βnWni + εi
(2.2)
2.3.3 Issue of endogeneity
There are three potential sources of endogeneity specific to this analysis. First,
is self-selection or selection bias. Households falling below certain levels of objec-
tive economic well-being may be more likely to receive program benefits. It is
also possible that household with members having greater creditworthiness and
entrepreneurship ability are more likely to receive microfinance loans. Second,
drawing upon the “frustrated achievers, happy peasants” paradox it is likely that
those receiving microfinance have greater expectations and aspirations while those
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receiving social transfers programs are inherently more content (Graham and Petti-
nato, 2002). And third, because the survey is cross-sectional and non-randomized
there could be a possible measurement error arising from the fact that the distribu-
tion of observed characteristics of recipients and non-recipients are different. These
would cause an issue of reverse causality or result in biased estimates. I address
these issues by using propensity score matching (PSM) whereby I create treatment
and control groups using statistical matching. It is rather challenging to use the
instrumental variables (IV) approach because the dependent variables, subjective
and objective economic well-being, are highly correlated with most socioeconomic
indicators.6 There are also certain advantages of using PSM over IV. PSM does
not assume linearity and it is valid even though there is little overlap between the
distributions of independent variables of treatment and control groups (Arun et al.,
2006). Further, the propensity score is a balancing score, that is, conditional on the
propensity score, the distributions of the observed covariates are independent of
the binary treatment (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). As a result, the distribution
of covariates are the same for the treated and control units resulting in more robust
treatment effects. The methodological details of and issues pertaining to PSM are
6I estimated IV models to test whether this was indeed the case. Commonly used instruments
in evaluating effects of being poverty alleviation program recipients are eligibility criteria.
Since social transfers and microfinance programs are generally targeted towards the poor
and low-income households instruments used are variables that reflect the poverty or income
status of the households. Previous studies have used land ownership, number of dependents,
and moneylenders’ rate of interest as instruments in evaluating the effect of these programs on
income or consumption (Pitt and Khandker, 1998; Islam, 2008; Berg and Emran, 2011; World
Bank, 2011). I followed the approach used by Islam (2008) and exploit the information on
household dwelling conditions in the survey and use a vector of instruments. The assumption
here was that dwelling conditions are exogenous and observable to program officers who use
them for targeting purposes. The vector of instruments I used were whether the household
has piped water, whether the household has electricity, and whether the household has a
toilet. To test the strength of the instruments I estimated first stage probit regression models
with the program recipient dummy as the dependent variable and the three instruments
as independent variables respectively. The results indicated that all three instruments are
moderate or statistically significant in predicting the probability of being a program recipient.
I then estimated second stage OLS regression models in which being a program recipient
was instrumented and ran the Hausman test to confirm whether only the IV estimates were
consistent. Two issues emerged. First, the IV specifications resulted in very large standard
errors thus rendering most of the effects insignificant. And second, the prob > chi2 of the
Hausman test for all specifications was greater than 0.10 suggesting that the null of no
endogeneity could not be rejected and the IV estimates were not significantly different from
OLS estimates. Results are available upon request.
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thoroughly reviewed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), Becker and Ichino (2002),
Dehejia and Wahba (2002), and Smith and Todd (2005). The most serious critique
is that the results of PSM are highly sensitive to the covariates included to compute
the propensity scores and the specific sample under analysis. In the absence of
true experimental data and valid instruments, PSM is the preferred method for
the purposes of analysis in this chapter.
As specified by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the propensity score is the
conditional probability of receiving a treatment (in this case being a program
recipient) given a set of pre-treatment household characteristics, X. Therefore,
p(X) = Pr{D = 1|X} = E{D|X} (2.3)
where, D = {0, 1} is the binary variable indicating whether the household has
received the treatment and X is the vector of pre-treatment characteristics. I test
the following treatments and their effects on subjective and objective economic
well-being - whether the household is a recipient of social transfers or microfinance,
whether the household received BDS, and whether the household is a long-term
social transfers or microfinance recipient. To estimate the treatment effect I follow
the approach suggested by Becker and Ichino (2002).
Upon computing the propensity score of each household p(Xi) the Average Effect
of Treatment on the Treated (ATT) is estimated as:
τ ≡ E{Y1i − Y0i |Di}
= E[E{Y1i − Y0i |Di = 1, p(Xi)}]
= E[E{Y1i |Di = 1, p(Xi)}]− E[E{Y0i |Di = 0, p(Xi)} |D = 1]
where, D = {0, 1} is the indicator of exposure to the treatment, that is, whether
the household has is a recipient of social transfers or microfinance, or whether
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household is a long-term recipient of social transfers or microfinance. X is the
multidimensional vector of pre-treatment covariates. Y1i and Y0i are the potential
outcomes, that is, levels of subjective or objective economic well-being, in the
two counterfactual situations of receiving and not receiving the treatment (Becker
and Ichino, 2002). Two hypotheses - satisfaction of the balancing property and
unconfoundedness are are needed to derive the treatment effect. The balancing
hypothesis implies that for a specific propensity score the treatment is randomly
distributed and thus the households receiving and not receiving the treatment are
identical. To satisfy the balancing property and avoid sensitivity to the inclusion
of additional covariates, I use the same set of covariates to compute the propensity
score across all treatments - area of residence, age of household head, whether the
head of the household is literate (can read and write), whether the head of the
household is married, whether the head of the household is female, and size of the
household. The unconfoundedness hypothesis implies that for a specific propensity
score the outcome or dependent variables (subjective or objective economic well-
being) are uncorrelated to the treatment. The unconfoundedness hypothesis cannot
be directly tested. However, given that the covariates used for matching are chosen
such that they are not likely to be influenced by the treatment, this condition can
be assumed to be satisfied.7
For matching, I use the caliper matching technique with 0.01 tolerance level.
Caliper matching is a refinement of nearest neighbor matching wherein a tolerance
level on the maximum propensity score distance (caliper) is used to avoid the
risk of bad matches. Observations from the treatment and control group are then
matched with the nearest neighbor within the caliper. While caliper matching
results in better matching as compared to standard nearest neighbor matching,
it uses only as many comparison units as are available within the calipers, thus
reducing the number of observations used for matching. A standard logit model is
7The covariates used for matching do not include employment status and household living
standards (poverty status) because it is assumed that both these variables are likely to be
affected by the treatment.
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used to calculate the propensity score, where the model can be written as,
Di = f(area, age, literate, married, female, size) (2.4)
where, Di is the dummy for the treatment variable, which is a function of the
covariates listed above. The quality of matching is tested using the bias reduction
approach which tests the bias reduction before and after matching. A bias in the
data is likely because in observational studies differences in observed covariates in
the treatment and control group are a common issue. After matching and testing
for the quality of matching, the results indicate that there is a significant reduction
in both the bias mean and standard deviation across the different treatments
as shown in Table 2.1. There is no set level for bias reduction above which the
matching is considered successful. However, existing empirical evidence suggests
that a 3 to 5 percent reduction in bias is satisfactory (Caliendo and Kopeinig,




From the descriptive statistics in Table 2.2 it is observed that approximately 23
percent of the households in the sample are microfinance recipients and approx-
imately 28 percent are social transfers recipients. On average households that
are microfinance recipients did so for 2.4 years and those that are social transfers
recipients did so for 10 months. Of those who receive microfinance, 10.3 percent are
long-term recipients, that is, they received loans for more than 4 years. As against
this, of those who receive social transfers, 23.7 percent are long-term recipients of











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A question of interest is - how does subjective and objective economic well-
being correlate in the sample under study? To answer the question, first, I
follow the method adopted by Carletto and Zezza (2006) and construct a cross-
tabulation of subjective and objective economic well-being. To match the 6 rungs of
subjective economic well-being, I generate 6 quantiles of the consumption variable.
The cross-tabulation is constructed such that the number of individuals on each
subjective economic well-being rung equals the number of individuals on the
corresponding objective economic well-being rung. In case there was a perfect
correlation between subjective and objective economic well-being, the off-diagonals
would have frequency equal to zero. Table 2.3 presents the results of the cross-
tabulation. Similar to the findings by Carletto and Zezza (2006) there appears to
be only a partial correspondence between subjective and objective economic well-
being. By observing the values in the diagonals we see that of the 111 households
who respond as being the poorest as per objective economic well-being only 20
households or 18 percent are in the poorest rung of subjective economic well-being.
Similarly, only 6 of the 76 households or 8 percent who responded as being the
richest as per objective evaluations of economic well-being are actually in the
highest rung of subjective economic well-being. The Spearman coefficient reveals
a moderate association between subjective and objective economic well-being
(r=0.3919). Therefore, there is certainly a difference in households’ subjective and
objective evaluations of economic well-being.
Second, I examine the poverty headcount ratios based on subjective and objective
economic well-being across variables of interest. Following Ravallion and Lokshin
(2002) and Carletto and Zezza (2006) I classify as poor those households according
to subjective economic well-being who fall in the lowest three rungs. And I classify
as poor those households according to objective economic well-being whose log
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1 2 3 4 5 6
1 20 48 33 8 1 1 111
2 44 108 121 51 21 1 346
3 31 109 248 149 99 25 661
4 10 49 153 123 103 22 460
5 2 24 88 116 70 21 321
6 4 8 18 13 27 6 76
Total 111 346 661 460 321 76 1975
value of consumption is 8 or below.8 In Table 2.4 it is observed that there are
differences in the poverty headcount ratio across all variables. For area of residence,
respondents in urban areas perceive themselves as being poorer than what the
objective measure suggests. In contrast, though much higher in percentage terms
as compared to urban residents, the difference between objective and subjective
economic well-being for rural residents is minimal. This might be due to relative
status effects as the reference group for rural households is much narrower than
urban households who live under conditions of greater disparity. Households whose
heads are unemployed perceive themselves as being poorer than what the objective
measure indicates. This is as expected because the unemployed may feel more
pessimistic about their current as well as future prospects as compared to those who
have similar levels of consumption but are employed. Interestingly, both, recipients
of microfinance and recipients of social transfers feel poorer than what the objective
measure suggests. However, the difference for recipients of social transfers is much
higher. A possible explanation for microfinance recipients might be that those
who apply for microfinance have higher expectations and aspirations to begin with
and therefore strive harder to achieve self-reliance. For social transfers recipients
the difference might be due to the lack of agency associated with in-kind social
transfers.
The initial descriptive analysis shows that despite the ELQ being a subjective
assessment of monetary well-being in terms of “rich” and “poor” it appears that
8The cut-off points are computed using the -poverty- procedure in Stata v.10
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households do not associate well-being exclusively with income or consumption
and other factors such as self-reliance and relative status may be at play. This is
also why it makes delineating the effects of being a program recipient on subjective
and objective economic well-being important and interesting.
Table 2.4 – Subjective and Objective Poverty Profile - Headcount Ratios
Variable Sub-group Subjective Objective
Area of residence Rural 39.79 38.72
Urban 17.94 3.06
Household head is literate No 50.60 46.99
Yes 21.93 9.99
Household head is married No 23.52 13.37
Yes 23.04 11.08
Household head is female No 23.28 11.82
Yes 22.51 10.26
Household head is unemployed No 11.05 5.26
Yes 23.16 11.61
Recipient of microfinance No 25.93 14.15
Yes 13.62 2.68
Recipient of social transfers No 17.55 6.34
Yes 37.41 2.48
Total 23.14 11.54
Notes: Table presents proportion of population in each sub-group under the specified
poverty line or cut-off point for subjective and objective poverty. Cut-off point for
subjective poverty is 3 and that for objective poverty or ln(consumption) is 8.
2.4.2 Regression results
The effect of being a microfinance recipient on subjective and objective economic
well-being is presented in Table 2.5. From column (1) and (3) it is observed that
being a microfinance recipient has a marginally statistically significant positive
effect on subjective economic well-being and has no statistically significant effect on
consumption. From the models including the interaction term it is observed that
being a microfinance recipient has a positive and statistically significant on both
subjective economic well-being and consumption of households that are very poor
(as compared to households who are microfinance recipients but not very poor).
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The length of receiving microfinance has no statistically significant effect on either
subjective economic well-being or consumption, which is observed in Table 2.6. For
robustness check, I estimate a model using actual years of receiving microfinance,
the results of which are presented in Table 2.7. It is seen that while each additional
year of receiving microfinance has no significant effect on subjective well-being, it
has a statistically significant and non-linear effect on consumption. This implies
that while being a microfinance recipient negatively affects consumption in the short-
term, it may have a positive and significant effect on consumption in the long-term.
The effect of being a recipient of business development service (BDS) is presented
in Table 2.8. It is observed that receiving BDS has a marginally statistically
significant positive effect on subjective economic well-being. In contrast, it has a
statistically significant negative effect on consumption on the overall sample but
no effect on the consumption of the very poor.
Table 2.5 – Being a microfinance recipient
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Microfinance recipient 0.111∗ -0.067 -0.001 -0.138∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.078) (0.026) (0.034)
Very poor HLS -0.669∗∗∗ -0.769∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.064) (0.025) (0.030)
Microfinance*VeryPoor 0.390∗∗∗ 0.300∗∗∗
(0.119) (0.050)
Observations 1975 1975 1975 1975
R2 0.171 0.176 0.438 0.446
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
60
Table 2.6 – Long-term Recipient of Microfinance
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-term microfinance recipient -0.116 -0.149 -0.067 -0.057
(0.161) (0.199) (0.069) (0.083)
Very Poor HLS -0.362∗∗∗ -0.371∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.108) (0.041) (0.043)
MicrofinanceLongTerm*VeryPoor 0.087 -0.027
(0.336) (0.143)
Observations 448 448 448 448
R2 0.092 0.093 0.432 0.433
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.7 – Testing non-linear effect of years of receiving microfinance
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Years of receiving microfin. 0.003 -0.000 -0.059∗∗∗ -0.055∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.047) (0.019) (0.019)
Years of receiving microfin. sq -0.000 -0.000 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Very Poor HLS -0.359∗∗∗ -0.393∗∗∗ -0.123∗∗∗ -0.086
(0.103) (0.149) (0.041) (0.053)
MicrofinanceYears*VeryPoor 0.014 -0.016
(0.043) (0.015)
Observations 448 448 448 448
R2 0.092 0.092 0.201 0.202
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.8 – Received Business Development Service (BDS)
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Received BDS 0.230∗ 0.172 -0.225∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗
(0.141) (0.168) (0.059) (0.074)
Very Poor HLS -0.351∗∗∗ -0.372∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.103∗∗
(0.103) (0.110) (0.040) (0.043)
BDSRecv*VeryPoor 0.152 -0.170
(0.306) (0.122)
Observations 448 448 448 448
R2 0.097 0.098 0.214 0.217
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Results in Table 2.9 suggest that being a recipient of social transfers has a
statistically significant negative effect on both subjective economic well-being as
well as consumption. However, being a recipient of social transfers does not have
any significant effect on subjective economic well-being or consumption of the
very poor. The length of receiving social transfers has a statistically significant
negative effect on both subjective economic well-being and consumption as is seen
from Table 2.10. Again however, the length of receiving social transfers does not
have any significant effect on subjective economic well-being or consumption of
the very poor. For robustness check, I estimate a model using actual months of
receiving social transfers, the results of which are presented in Table 2.11. It is
observed that there is a non-linear effect of receiving social transfers on subjective
economic well-being and the effect is marginally statistically significant. This
implies that while receiving social transfers has no significant effect on subjective
economic well-being in the initial months, there is a significant negative effect
being a social transfers recipient in the long-term. Further, there is a non-linear
and statistically significant negative effect of being a social transfers recipient on
consumption implying that the initial positive effects on consumption wear off with
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each additional month of being a recipient.
Table 2.9 – Being a social transfers recipient
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social transfers recipient -0.432∗∗∗ -0.465∗∗∗ -0.141∗∗∗ -0.160∗∗∗
(0.063) (0.103) (0.030) (0.045)
Very Poor HLS -0.624∗∗∗ -0.635∗∗∗ -0.325∗∗∗ -0.331∗∗∗
(0.054) (0.061) (0.025) (0.028)
SocialTransfer*VeryPoor 0.050 0.029
(0.124) (0.058)
Observations 1975 1975 1975 1975
R2 0.190 0.191 0.445 0.446
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 2.10 – Long-term recipient of social transfers
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Long-term social transfers recipient -0.358∗∗∗ -0.206 -0.336∗∗∗ -0.504∗∗∗
(0.116) (0.354) (0.065) (0.161)
Very poor HLS -0.600∗∗∗ -0.569∗∗∗ -0.256∗∗∗ -0.286∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.120) (0.053) (0.054)
SocialTransferLongTerm*VeryPoor -0.182 0.201
(0.368) (0.169)
Observations 528 528 528 528
R2 0.131 0.132 0.443 0.445
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.11 – Testing non-linear effect of months of receiving social transfers
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Months of receiving soc. transfers 0.018 0.022 0.051∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.028) (0.031) (0.014) (0.015)
Months of receiving soc. transfers sq -0.002∗ -0.002∗ -0.003∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Very Poor HLS -0.598∗∗∗ -0.546∗∗∗ -0.255∗∗∗ -0.446∗∗∗
(0.114) (0.211) (0.053) (0.095)
SocTransferMonths*VeryPoor -0.005 0.021∗∗
(0.021) (0.009)
Observations 528 528 528 528
R2 0.128 0.129 0.438 0.443
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.4.3 Decomposing the effect on consumption
A plausible concern specific to the effect of receiving social transfers on consumption
is the summing up of different components of expenditures to operationalize the
objective economic well-being measure. It is possible that while certain consumption
expenditures decrease, such as expenditure on food, certain other expenditures
increase, such as expenditure on education and health. The negative sign on
consumption in most of the models suggests a possible substitution effect as, on
average, for households in the sample 59 percent of the total expenditure is on food
and the in-kind social transfers covered in this survey primarily consist of food aid.
To examine this, I run multivariate regression models with three key components
of expenditure as the dependent variables - food, education, and health.9 In
addition to being a microfinance recipient I use number of loans as an independent
variable to test whether there is any substitution effect away from consumption
expenditures towards payment of loans or whether more loans correspond to
increased consumption. The results are summarized in Table 2.12. Being a recipient
9Food, education, and health expenditures constitute on average 70 percent of the total
expenditures in the sample under study.
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of microfinance statistically significantly increases consumption expenditure on food,
education, and health. The length of receiving microfinance and receiving BDS
does not have any significant effect on the consumption components. Also, number
of loans do not have any significant effect on any of the consumption components.
On the other hand, being a recipient of social transfers statistically significantly
decreases expenditure on food suggesting that there might be a substitution effect
at play.
Table 2.12 – Effect on Food, Education, and Health Consumption Expenditures
Variable Food Education Health
Microfinance recipient +*** +*** +***
Long-term microfinance recipient - - +
Number of loans - + +
Received BDS - + -
Social transfers recipient -* - -
Long-term social transfers recipient - - +
Notes: Summary of results from multivariate regression. Dependent variables are food
expenditure, education expenditure, and health expenditure. The following variables are
included in the regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household
head, whether household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether
household head is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.4.4 PSM results
The results of PSM, summarized in Table 2.13, are consistent with the OLS
regression results and serve as a robustness check. Being a recipient of microfinance
and BDS have a positive effect on subjective economic well-being while being a
recipient of social transfers has a negative effect on subjective economic well-being.
Similar to the OLS results, all treatments have a negative effect on consumption.
Further, being a long-term recipient of microfinance and social transfers both have







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































While PSM is useful in controlling for endogeneity, these results have to be
treated with caution. Recent discussions between Smith and Todd (2005) and
Dehejia (2005) highlight two possible issues related to PSM and cross-sectional
data. First, unobserved characteristics or time effects cannot be controlled for using
cross-sectional data. And second, bias associated with cross-sectional matching
estimators may be large without a good set of covariates or if treated and control
households are not strictly comparable, for example, if they are located in areas
with starkly different characteristics (Smith and Todd, 2005; Arun et al., 2006). In
this sample, the results could be possibly biased because of the oversampling of
urban households.
2.4.5 Controlling for consumption in the subjective economic
well-being specification
It is possible that the relationship between being a program recipient and subjective
economic well-being is confounded by consumption. This could mean that if
consumption is controlled for in the specification the effect on subjective economic
well-being is no longer significant, or, because household rank themselves differently
on the subjective and objective measures (as was observed in the descriptive
analysis), the effect on subjective economic well-being may not change. The results
in Table 2.14 suggest that even after controlling for consumption the significant
positive effect of being a microfinance recipient on the subjective economic well-
being of the very poor remains. The significant positive effect of receiving BDS on
subjective economic well-being also remains. Further, the statistically significant
negative effect of receiving social transfers on subjective economic well-being
continues to hold. The results provide robustness to the findings in previous
sections and reveal that being a program recipient has an effect on subjective
economic well-being over and above objective economic well-being. This may
be driven by the difference in the manner households rank themselves on these
measures and that these measures are not perfectly positively correlated.
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2.5 Effects of being a program recipient on subjective and objective
economic well-being
The results from the non-experimental regression results and the quasi-experimental
PSM results highlight three key effects of being a recipient of microfinance and
social transfers on subjective and objective economic well-being - (i) households
value livelihood promotion and self-reliance (ii) being a recipient of in-kind social
transfers can cause “welfare stigma” but not among the very poor (iii) livelihood
promoting programs have a positive effect on the consumption of the very poor,
and (iv) in-kind social transfers have a negative effect on consumption possibly
due to a substitution effect.
First, for the very poor, being a microfinance recipient has a statistically signifi-
cant positive effect on both subjective and objective economic well-being. This
suggests that the poor value livelihood promotion and the prospect of being self-
reliant. Though only marginally significant, the positive effect of receiving BDS on
subjective economic well-being further underscores the desire of households to be
self-reliant. To re-ascertain the positive effects of being a microfinance recipient I
estimate a model that includes a dummy for households that are recipients of both
microfinance and social transfers. The purpose behind doing this to determine
whether the benefits of receiving microfinance are confounded by also being a social
transfers recipient. It is seen from Table 2.15 that even after controlling for this
group, being a microfinance recipient continues to have a statistically significant
positive effect on subjective and objective economic well-being of the very poor.
The PSM results further buttress the positive effects of being a microfinance recip-
ient on subjective economic well-being. These effects suggest that tying livelihood
promoting programs with a BDS such as providing agricultural extension services


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.15 – Robustness check for effects of being a microfinance recipient
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Microfinance recipient 0.197∗∗∗ -0.037 -0.003 -0.146∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.085) (0.030) (0.038)
Microfinance & SocialTransfer -0.318∗∗∗ -0.144 0.007 0.039
(0.118) (0.156) (0.044) (0.057)
Very Poor HLS -0.660∗∗∗ -0.771∗∗∗ -0.341∗∗∗ -0.418∗∗∗





Observations 1975 1975 1975 1975
R2 0.174 0.181 0.438 0.447
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Second, there is evidence of a likely “welfare stigma” associated with being
a social transfers recipient as well as the length of receiving social transfers as
suggested by the statistically significant negative effect on subjective economic
well-being in the regression models. I re-ascertain the welfare stigma effect by
including the dummy for households that are recipients of both microfinance and
social transfers and the negative effect on subjective economic well-being still
holds as observed in Table 2.16. The PSM results further strengthen this effect.
Interestingly, for social transfers recipients who are very poor, subjective economic
well-being is seemingly of little concern. The effects suggest that though being
a social transfers recipients make households in general “feel poorer”, it is an
important safety net for very poor households for whom receiving in-kind social
transfers in times of economic distress or consumption smoothing is of greater
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concern. This is also supported by the literature on the impact of in-kind social
transfers on well-being of the poor in Peru (Copestake, 2008). Further, there is
evidence that in-kind social transfers have a marginally significant negative effect
on food expenditure owing to a possible substitution effect. However, whether the
additional disposable income is invested in human capital development, especially
education and health, is not supported by the data.
Table 2.16 – Robustness check for effects of being a social transfers recipient
Subjective Subjective Objective Objective
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social transfers recipient -0.502∗∗∗ -0.604∗∗∗ -0.185∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.130) (0.037) (0.062)
Microfinance & SocialTransfer 0.250∗∗ 0.367∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗ 0.116
(0.119) (0.185) (0.050) (0.076)
Very Poor HLS -0.620∗∗∗ -0.641∗∗∗ -0.322∗∗∗ -0.336∗∗∗





Observations 1975 1975 1975 1975
R2 0.192 0.193 0.447 0.448
Notes: OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables are
6-step ELQ and log of annual consumption. The following variables are included in the
regression models but not reported: area of residence, age of household head, whether
household head is literate, whether household head is married, whether household head
is female, size of the household, and whether household head is employed.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Third, there is a statistically significant positive effect of being a microfinance
recipient on consumption of the very poor as is revealed in the OLS analysis. De-
composing the positive effect on consumption using a multivariate regression model
suggests that livelihood promoting programs that emphasize income generation not
only improve subjective economic well-being, but also lead to more income being
allocated towards investment in human capital development. These findings have
an important policy implication and indicate that livelihood promotion programs
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are better suited to achieve sustainable reduction in multidimensional poverty and
greater human development.
And fourth, contrary to the expected result, receiving in-kind social transfers
has a significant negative effect on overall consumption expenditures. Upon further
examination, I find that the negative effect might be due to a substitution effect
where in-kind food transfers subsidize food consumption resulting in an overall
negative effect on consumption because food expenditures comprise the largest
component of total household consumption expenditure.
2.6 Conclusion
The main finding of this chapter is that the effect of being a recipient of a
livelihood protecting program on subjective (or perceived) economic well-being is
different as compared to the effect of being a recipient of a livelihood promoting
program. This effect is robust to various specifications controlling for possibly
confounding variables. Specifically, I find that the “welfare stigma” phenomenon is
manifested among households that are recipients of livelihood protecting programs.
However, the effects are not observed among the very poor households. Further, I
find particularly significant positive effects on subjective economic well-being of
the very poor resulting from being a recipient of livelihood promoting programs
implying that such recipients feel “less poor” and have a preference for poverty
alleviation programs that promote self-reliance and income generation. In addition
to the effects on subjective economic well-being, I find that being a recipient of
livelihood promoting programs significantly increases consumption of the very
poor. Disaggregating the consumption component reveals that being a recipient of
livelihood promoting programs significantly increases investments in human capital
development, particularly increased investment in education and health. Further,
I find that livelihood protecting programs that provide in-kind transfers have a
negative effect on consumption, which is reverse of the expected result and possibly
due to a substitution effect.
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Though the results are specific to Peru, the broader policy goal emanating
from the main finding is that poverty alleviation programs should emphasize
income generation and self-reliance. However, obvious challenges are involved in
implementing and monitoring large-scale livelihood promoting programs such as
microfinance. Further, preference for programs promoting income generation and
self-reliance does not discount the need for livelihood protection as is revealed
by the absence of welfare stigma among the very poor. Therefore, a possible
approach is to identify a middle ground that combines both livelihood protection
and promotion, and achieves income security, self-reliance, and human capital
development. Evidence of positive effects of such a program called the Income
Generation for Vulnerable Group Development Program (IGVGD) implemented in
Bangladesh by BRAC have been found by Matin and Hulme (2003). The IGVGD
combines food aid with skills training and microloans and reaches out to more
than 1.2 million poor households. More generally, optimizing the benefits poverty
alleviation interventions requires the creation of a program design and evaluation
framework that combines objective and subjective well-being. This could be a
fruitful avenue for further research using panel and experimental data.
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Chapter 3
Is there a high degree of inequality of opportunity for rural-urban
migrant children in China?
3.1 Introduction
“Before the reform, the wall between the city and the countryside was tall and
colossal; the gates passing through were few and tight. To the ordinary peasant the
gates were practically closed, and climbing the wall was harder than ’going up to
the blue sky’. Since the reforms, the wall has been lowered and the gates are opened
more and wider. But to many, the dividing wall remains, so do the gates and locks”
(Chan and Zhang, 1999).
The economic reforms since 1978 have transformed China into a market-driven
and enviously high-growth economy. According to Ravallion and Chen (2007),
in the 20 years after 1981, the proportion of the population living in poverty in
China has fallen from 53 percent to 8 percent. However, the gains of rapid growth
and poverty reduction have not been equally distributed and inequality in China
has grown over the same period. According to the Chinese National Bureau of
Statistics (CNBS) the overall Gini grew from 0.317 in 1978 to 0.496 in 2006. Of
particularly significance is the inequality between urban and rural areas. Based on
CNBS data, the Gini coefficients of urban and rural areas in 1978 were 0.16 and
0.21, respectively, which worsened to 0.32 and 0.36, respectively, by 2001 (Ravallion
and Chen, 2007; Zhang and Eriksson, 2010). The general picture that emerges
from the China story is that rapid economic growth has been accompanied by
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high levels of income inequality. More and more, social scientists argue that this
inequality in China might in fact be a “social volcano” that may lead to social
unrest (Whyte, 2010).
A limitation of merely examining the Gini coefficient is that it does not provide
any insight into critical questions of policy and normative significance such as
whether inequality is a result of differences in individual efforts such as education,
which could be acceptable to the society, or whether it is a result of discrimination
based on factors over which the individuals have no control such as region of birth
(urban or rural). The unbalanced development of urban and rural areas and the
resulting regional inequality has long been examined by researchers. However, there
is a growing argument that China is no longer a country of “two peoples”, that is,
urban and rural. Rather, it has developed into a country of “three peoples”, that
is, urban, rural, and the rural-urban migrants (Feng, 2010). The institutionalized
hukou or household registration system has deepened the rural-urban cleavage
and has created a new group of citizens, the rural-urban migrants, for whom clear
differences exist in the quality of life and chances for upward mobility. Therefore,
holistically analyzing inequality in China would mean applying a different lens
that incorporates individuals’ background factors, particularly, residence status.
In this chapter I address several gaps that exist in the literature on inequality in
China. First, I go beyond income inequality and examine inequality of opportunity
in China on which there is very little research done. Second, instead of comparing
only urban and rural residents, I add rural-urban migrants, who, even though
they face unique social and institutional constraints, remain a largely ignored
population in research on inequality in China. Third, a lot has been written
about the disadvantages that have resulted from the hukou system for rural-urban
migrants. However, this is the first attempt to actually measure the degree of
inequality. And fourth, I focus on inequality of opportunity for migrant children as
it is a critical indicator of intergenerational mobility and perpetuation of inequality.
To achieve this, I apply the Human Opportunity Index (HOI) developed by
75
Barros et al. (2009) which draws upon the inequality of opportunity framework
proposed by Roemer (1993, 1998). Roemer (1998) segregates individual advantage
into two components. First is “circumstances” such as family background, region
of birth, or gender, over which individuals have no influence. And second is “efforts”
that consists of factors based on individual choices such as education and type
of occupation. He argues that inequality of opportunity caused by circumstances
should be compensated for by the society. Drawing upon this, Barros et al. (2009)
developed the Human Opportunity Index that combines both the coverage or access
to basic opportunities and the degree to which the distribution of the opportunities
is conditional on circumstances. Following their methodology, I develop the HOI for
children of urban residents, rural residents, and rural-urban migrants using the 2002
Chinese Household Income Project and examine the distribution of opportunities
essential for the development of children - education, access to safe water, and access
to sanitation. Further, I examine the correlation between inequality of opportunity
for children and the subjective well-being of their households. Specifically, I use
household’s subjective standard of living assessments, happiness, and feelings of
upward mobility to determine the association.
The key findings of this chapter are that rural-urban migrant children in China
are significantly disadvantaged when compared to urban and even rural children.
Inequality of opportunity for migrant children exists in access to education as well as
in basic services such as access to water and sanitation. I also find that an increase
in the HOI for migrant children is positively and significantly associated with
the subjective well-being of migrant households measured in terms of subjective
standard of living and feelings of upward mobility. This indicates that reducing
inequality of opportunity for migrant children is a possible avenue for policy
intervention aimed at furthering well-being of migrants as well as ending the cycle
of continued intergenerational disadvantage.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a brief review of
literature on rural-urban inequality in China and inequality of opportunity. Section
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3.3 discusses the data, methodology, and empirical strategy. Section 3.4 presents
the summary statistics and main results. Section 3.5 discusses reasons behind
inequality of opportunity for rural-urban migrant children. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Review of literature
3.2.1 Rural-urban inequality in China
Historically, rural-urban inequality in China has been attributed to two factors -
regional, that is, extensive focus on coast-oriented and urban-biased development
and institutional, that is, the hukou system. The two factors are also interlinked
as the hukou system constrains those from rural areas from migrating to urban
areas to take advantage of the growth and opportunities. Previous studies have
focused almost exclusively on income inequality. They find that prior to the
implementation of market reforms income distribution among urban residents was
fairly uniform due to state control on urban wages and slow-changing pay scales.
However, because of various rural reforms in the 1970s and early 1980s and the
hukou system, rural income distribution varied substantially (Rozelle and Boisvert,
1995; Lu and Wang, 2002). Using data from the China Statistical Yearbooks
and applying the Theil decomposition method, Lu and Wang (2002) find that
rural-urban inequality widened over the period 1978-1998.
The unique hukou system, introduced in China in 1958, lies at the crux of the
rural-urban inequality debate. The original intention of the hukou system was
to ensure minimum agricultural output and job security in cities. However, over
the decades it was used to prevent free movement of labor from rural to urban
areas as well as to determine eligibility for benefits across various social programs
including education. Even though post-1978 economic reforms have urged the
government to reform the hukou system, its essential features remain the same.
The reforms have eased restrictions on rural-urban migration and enabled migrants
to gain temporary and conditional residence in urban areas. However, the migrants
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have largely been left out of social protection programs and entitlements for which
urban hukou holders are eligible such as employment in urban government jobs,
healthcare, housing, and public education. The discrimination against migrants
essentially rendered them second class citizens taking up jobs shunned by the
urban residents and living in sub-standard conditions (Knight and Song, 1999;
Knight and Song, 2005). Given that the “floating population” or migrants without
local household registration has been on the rise, this is a serious development
concern. To get a sense of the magnitude, the floating population was estimated
to be around 88.5 million in 1995 and increased to about 121 million according to
the 2000 census. The 2010 census estimated the floating population to be around
221 million, an increase of approximately 83 percent from the 2000 figure (Chan
and Zhang, 1999; Liang and Ma, 2004; Feng, 2010).
A huge gap remains, however, in examining inequality specifically among rural-
urban migrants or the floating population in China when compared to rural and
urban residents. In a recent paper, Sicular et al. (2007) argue that it is imperative
for income inequality measurements in China to account for migrants as migration
is an important mechanism in narrowing the rural-urban income gap. They further
argue that excluding the migrants can cause measurement errors as it can cause
an overstatement of the rural-urban income gap. They use the 1995 and 2002
Household Income Surveys conducted by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
(CASS) and recalculate income inequality after including migrants. They find that
in 2002 the rural-urban gap contributes about 25 percent of overall inequality, as
compared to estimates of 50 percent or more in most studies. Further, they find
that the contribution of location in determining overall inequality declined between
1995 and 2002 indicating the positive effects of spatial mobility.
In addition to measurement of income inequality, an interesting line of research
undertaken on inequality in China is assessing the perceptions of the Chinese
people on inequality and distributive justice. The 2004 China National Survey
on Inequality and Distributive Justice, led by Harvard sociologist Martin King
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Whyte, is a project aimed explicitly at providing an overview of how Chinese
adults feel about patterns of inequality and mobility opportunities in their society.
Of the 3,267 respondents in the survey, which included migrants, 59.2 percent
felt that denying urban household registration to migrants is unfair. When asked
about practices such as preventing migrant children from attending urban public
schools unless they pay special high fees and forbidding the hiring of migrants for
a range of urban jobs, 76.8 percent of the respondents felt that they are unfair.
Further, 66.9 percent of the respondents felt that exclusion of rural-urban migrants
from welfare benefits enjoyed by the urban residents is unfair. This antipathy
towards hukou-based discrimination was not concentrated among people of rural
origin. The survey found that even urban residents recognized the unfairness
of institutionalized discrimination though their disagreement was less strong as
compared to migrants (Whyte, 2010).
Although discrimination against migrants continues to exist in urban areas in
China, the well-being effects of rural-urban migration are somewhat mixed. Using
the 2004 China National Survey on Inequality and Distributive Justice, Feng (2010)
finds that the migrants themselves remain optimistic and report more gains from
their decision to migrate.1 He finds that 75 percent of the migrants reported that
their lives at the time of the survey (in 2004) were better than five years ago as
compared to 59 percent of urban and 66 percent of rural respondents. Nearly 66
percent of the migrants responded that they were more optimistic about the future
as compared to roughly 60 percent of the urban and rural respondents. It may seem
counterintuitive that the migrants, who are relatively disadvantaged reported being
most optimistic. Feng (2010) argues that this is likely due to the fact that migrants
evaluate their current status with reference to their situation when living in rural
areas. For them, the opportunity to move to cities and engage in non-agricultural
production plausibly overrides the disadvantages of not holding urban residency.
In line with the findings of Whyte (2010), Feng finds that compared to urban or
1Migrants are defined as individuals who held rural or agricultural hukou but resided in an
urban area at the time of the survey.
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rural residents, migrants felt more strongly about the injustice done to them with
regards to obtaining urban hukou, allowing their children to attend urban public
schools, and receiving benefits that only urban residents are currently entitled to.
While Feng (2010) finds that migrants on average are more optimistic about their
well-being, there is evidence that suggests otherwise. Using 2002 Chinese Household
Income Project data, Knight and Gunatilaka (2010) find that on average migrants
report lower happiness when compared to rural residents. They test various
hypotheses and conclude that unsatisfactory conditions in which the migrants live,
insecure nature of their employment, and rise in aspirations due to comparison
with urban households all explain the low mean happiness levels of rural-urban
migrants in China.2 Using the same data, Jiang et al. (2011) find that income
inequality between migrants without local urban hukou and urban residents is
negatively correlated with happiness of migrants. However, when between-group
income inequality is measured for three groups - rural migrants without local
urban hukou, residents born in urban areas, and urban residents who have acquired
urban hukou at some point in the past - the acquired urban residents are the most
unhappy with inequality. This suggests that even though they are more advantaged
as compared to migrants without local urban hukou they still identify with the
migrant group and are more inequality averse. Thus, inequality among migrants
in urban China does have serious repercussions for their well-being.
3.2.2 Inequality of opportunity
According to the 2006 World Development Report, inequality of opportunity is
of significance to policymakers mainly because it is intrinsically unfair and can
lead to social instability and conflict. Further, shifting the debate away from
income redistribution towards opportunity redistribution is likely to gain more
political consensus and also provides a better direction for formulating policy and
2They also find that inherent disposition to be happy or unhappy is not a predominant
explanatory factor for the low mean happiness scores of migrants.
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interventions (Barros et al., 2009). The idea of equality of opportunity is to level
the playing field such that each individual has, in principle, the potential to achieve
and maximize their desired outcomes.
Normative frameworks proposed by egalitarian philosophers such as Rawls (1971),
Dworkin (1981a, 1981b), and Sen (1985) posit that distributive justice does not
necessitate the equality of individual outcomes, but rather it requires that all
individuals have equal opportunities that lead to certain outcomes of interest.
Borrowing from these egalitarian theories, Roemer (1993, 1998) proposes and
articulates that society should indemnify people against poor outcomes that are
the consequences of causes that are beyond their control (circumstance), but
not against outcomes that are the consequences of causes that are within their
control (effort, personal will, or ambition). Roemer (1998) identifies five words
that constitute the vocabulary of equality of opportunity - circumstance, effort,
type, objective, and instrument. Objective is the kind of outcome or well-being
or advantage to achieve which the individual wishes to equalize opportunities.
Circumstance is the set of social or environmental influences, which is beyond the
individual’s control and which affects his or her chances of acquiring the objective.
Effort is the autonomously chosen action, which is within the individual’s control
and which if applied in greater amounts will increase the degree to which the
individual achieves the objective. Type is the set of individuals with the same
circumstances and the instrument is the policy intervention used to realize the
equalization. Formally, an individual’s production function using Roemer’s (1998)
framework can be represented as:
vi = v(ei, Ct(i), xt(i)) (3.1)
where, viis the individual i’s achieved value of objective, eiis the level of i’s effort,
t(i) is the type i belong to, Ct(i)is the circumstance of i’s type, and xt(i)is the value
of the policy intervention that i’s type enjoys.
Drawing upon Roemer (1998) it can be argued that inequality on the basis of
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educational attainment is justifiable, however inequality on the basis of gender,
race, or place of birth is unjustifiable. A challenge that remains however is to
empirically assess equality of opportunity, and identify and operationalize variables
that count as circumstance and effort, especially when factors such as effort are
unobservable. Much of the empirical work done on equality of opportunity focuses
on family background as the circumstances and on income or earnings as the
outcome. In their study on inequality of opportunity in Brazil, Bourguignon et
al. (2007) find that five observed circumstances - father’s education, mother’s
education, father’s occupation, race, and region of birth - affect inequality in
earnings. Ferreira and Gignoux (2008) examine inequality of opportunity for labor
earnings in six Latin American countries and essentially find the same pattern.
Parental education emerges as the most important contributor to inequality of
opportunity. Cogneau and Mesple-Somps (2008) examine inequality of opportunity
for income in five sub-Saharan countries in Africa and find that in addition to family
background characteristics, between country differences, mainly, social origins and
history of colonization have a significant impact on intergenerational differences in
income. There exists a huge gap in studies on inequality of opportunity in China.
Zhang and Eriksson (2010) provide the first available evidence on inequality of
opportunity for income in China. They find that parental income and parents’ type
of employer explain two-thirds of the inequality of opportunity for income while
parental education and region of birth do not significantly contribute to individual
advantage.
Yet another challenge that faces empirical assessment of inequality of opportunity
is the lack of an established measurement indicator or index. Most studies apply
the Theil index to decompose the effect of various circumstances on outcomes
that are essentially continuous such as income, consumption, and educational
achievement (Bourguignon et al., 2007; Barros et al., 2009; Zhang and Eriksson,
2010). Recent work by Barros et al. (2009) has resulted in the development of
the Human Opportunity Index (HOI), which measures inequality of opportunity
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for discrete outcomes for children. The HOI measures the inequality for access to
basic opportunities for children such as access to education, health, sanitation, and
other basic services with the idea that a just society should attempt to equitably
supply these basic opportunities to as many children as possible. Where it is found
that distribution is unequal, the index suggests that more opportunities should
be created for the disadvantaged groups. The HOI has advantages over other
measures in that it focuses on a limited number of basic opportunities that can be
observed, tracked, and for which data are usually available. Further, by focusing
on children it invalidates the issue of endogeneity that concerns measurements of
inequality of opportunity. For instance, in the case of an adult, access to water
might depend on the choice of location, which is likely within her control and
therefore we cannot attribute it entirely to circumstance. However, for a child,
access to water is entirely dependent on the choices made by her parents and
therefore are exogenous to her. Another argument in favor of the HOI is that early
life opportunities for children are quintessential for development later in life and
can provide a better ex-ante outlook of intergenerational upward mobility.
3.3 Data and methodology
3.3.1 Data description
This study uses data from the 2002 Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP)
conducted by the Institute of Economics, CASS, which contains data on 20,632
urban residents (from 6,835 urban households); 37,969 rural residents (from 9,200
rural households); and 5,327 rural-urban migrants (from 2,005 migrant households).
There is very little panel element in the data and none for the variables of interest.3
The urban and rural samples are sub-groups of the official census. However, the
census does not cover rural hukou holders residing in urban areas, that is, the
rural-urban migrants. Therefore, a separate methodology was followed to identify
3The CHIP surveys were also conducted in 1988 and 1995. However, they do not contain
samples of migrants.
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the migrant sample. The migrant households were selected from all the provinces
but not from all the cities in the urban survey. As rural-urban migrants are
concentrated in large cities, all the provincial capital cities and one or two middle-
sized cities in each of the provinces, were selected for the migrant survey. Owing
to the sampling frame limitations, the migrant sample was drawn from migrant
neighborhoods consisting of shared or rented apartments.4 This is advantageous
for this study as the sample contains a substantial number of migrant families with
children. Migrants living on construction sites or in factories were not included
in the sample. The migrant survey contains a rich set of indicators that include
demographic information of each member, income, consumption, assets, housing,
health status, education, and subjective well-being (Sicular et al., 2007; Knight
and Gunatilaka, 2010).
Even though the urban and rural samples are sub-groups of the census, the
CHIP 2002 under-sampled urban residents. To make the samples representative, I
weight the analyses such that the urban and rural population shares equal those in
the population in each province according to the 2000 official census. For weighting
the migrant population, I use the population proportions of “residents living in
urban areas for more than six months but having permanent household registration
elsewhere” in each province from the 2000 census data as weights. For analytical
purposes, I only use sub-groups of children aged 0 to 16 years across urban, rural,
and migrant households, which results in a total of 11,625 observations - 2,834
urban children; 7,528 rural children; and 1,263 migrant children.
3.3.2 Methodology
To examine the degree of inequality of opportunity in access to basic opportunities
among migrant and non-migrant (urban and rural) children, I follow the methodol-
ogy for computing the HOI laid out by Barros et al. (2008, 2009) and adapted
4Urban resident committees register apartments making them easier to identify when drawing
the sampling frame.
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by Singh (2011). The HOI is a composite index that combines - (i) to how many
children are the basic opportunities available, that is, the coverage rate, and (ii)
how equitably are the basic opportunities distributed conditional on exogenous
circumstances. To measure equity a dissimilarity index or the D-Index is used.
Here, it is also important to clarify the definition of a “basic opportunity”. A
basic opportunity is an indicator that - (i) influences current and future outcomes
such as income and wages (ii) is critical for the development of the individual (iii)
is exogenous to the individual but endogenous to the society, that is, it can be
modified through policy intervention and (iv) is likely negatively influenced by
circumstances.
The key component of the HOI used to estimate inequality of opportunity is the
D-Index. It measures the dissimilarity in access for a given basic opportunity for
groups defined by the circumstances (such as migrant status, parental education,
parental income, gender, and so on) compared with the average access rate for the
given basic opportunity for the population as a whole. The D-index is the weighted
average of all such access probability gaps, that is, the weighted average of absolute
differences between group-specific access rates pi and the overall average access rate
p̄. If the equal opportunity principle is consistently applied, an exact correspondence
between population and opportunity distribution should be observed. The D-index
ranges from 0 to 1 (0 to 100 in percentage terms), and in a situation of perfect
equality of opportunity, D will be zero. For instance, if migrant and rural children
are the two subgroups and pm is the average probability that a migrant child will
have access to education which is less than p̄, that is, the average probability in
the entire population that a child will have access to education, then it suggests
that migrant children have much lower probability of having access to education
than their rural counterparts. The D-index can be interpreted as showing the
fraction of all available opportunities that needs to be reassigned from better-off
groups (groups whose access rate is higher than the access rate for the population)
to worse-off groups (groups whose access rate is lower than the access rate for
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the population) to achieve equal distribution of the opportunity for all. It is
important to clarify that the D-index does not imply that opportunities be taken
away from the advantaged group to be redistributed to the disadvantaged group.
The definition refers to reallocation in the statistical sense where opportunities need
to be reassigned to produce a distribution in the disadvantaged group that matches
that of the advantaged group. In the policy sense however, improving the D-index
would mean increasing access and creating opportunities for the disadvantaged
group through targeted interventions to bring them up to par. It is also important
to note that the D-index is insensitive to a balanced increase in access rate, which
means that the new opportunities are distributed among circumstance groups in
the same way as the preexisting distributions are.
The HOI, represented by O, is conceived as O = p̄(1−D), where the coverage
rate p̄ is discounted if D is high, that is, the basic opportunities are inequitably
distributed. Intuitively, an increase in coverage p̄ will improve the HOI. But in
addition, because the HOI is also distribution-sensitive, it will improve further if
the increased opportunities benefit the disadvantaged groups, that is, D is reduced.
Despite its distributive sensitivity the HOI is Pareto-consistent in that an increase
in the number of basic opportunities available to any group will always increase the
index. Again, it should be noted that the definition of HOI refers to availability
and equitable distribution of opportunities in statistical terms. From a policy
perspective, improving HOI would mean increasing access to and creating more
basic opportunities for the disadvantaged group.
3.3.2.1 Computing the D-index and HOI
Adopting the approach of Barros et al. (2008, 2009), the D-index is computed
using a three-step procedure. First, I use the following separable logistic regression




P (I = 1 | x1, ..., xm)







where, for each child i, Ii = 1 if the child has access to the basic opportunity
and Ii = 0 otherwise; xk denotes the vector of variables representing k-dimension
of circumstances, hence x = (x1, ..., xm). The circumstances included are described
in subsequent paragraphs. Second, using the predicted probability of access to
a basic opportunity for every child, I obtain the average access rate [p̄] and the










wi | p̂i − p̄ | (3.4)
where, p̂i is the predicted probability of access to the basic opportunity for child
i and wi =
1
n
or the sampling weight.
Once the average access rate and the D-index have been estimated, the third
step is to compute the HOI [O], which is simply a product of the average access
rate and how equitably the access to basic opportunity is distributed across the
population under consideration.
O = p̄(1−D) (3.5)
Similar to the D-index, the HOI also varies between 0 and 1. However, as
opposed to the D-index for which a lower value implies more equity, a higher HOI
is desirable for any society. This is because HOI will be higher only when the
average access rate is high and the inequality in access rate is low. I compute the
HOI for the full sample and for the three sub-groups - urban children, rural children,
and migrant children. Further, the HOI is computed for each basic opportunity
and a composite HOI, which is a simple average of the respective HOIs, is also
computed.
The variables used to operationalize circumstances in the estimation are gender,
province, residence status based on hukou (migrant, urban, or rural), minority
87
status, whether head of the household is a member of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP), household consumption expenditure, father’s education (quadratic form
also included), mother’s education (quadratic form also included), father’s health
status, mother’s health status, whether both parents are present, and number of
children in the household.5
The variables used to operationalize basic opportunities are whether the child
completed primary education on time, whether the child is currently enrolled in
school, whether the child has access to safe water, whether the child has access to
sanitation, and whether the child has access to electricity. Completion of primary
education is used in addition to enrollment because mere enrollment does not reflect
quality of education. It is possible that where migrant children are concentrated the
quality of schools is extremely poor and also migrant children might face significant
interruptions in education due to non-urban hukou. In China, typical age for
completing primary education is 12 years. For analytical purposes, assuming that
there are some children who repeat grades due to poor performance, children whose
highest level of completed education was primary before the age of 14 years are
considered as “completed primary education on time”. Enrollment in school is
measured for children aged 6 to 15 years because the Chinese government has
mandated primary and junior middle school education, which is typically for nine
years starting at age six. Further, there is empirical evidence that access to safe
drinking water, sanitation, and electricity is highly and positively correlated to
child health (Pant, 1991; Wang, 2003; Fay et al., 2005; Daka and Ballet, 2011).
Prevention of diseases and mortality among children directly impinge upon their
long-term health and development. Access to electricity on the other hand allows
children to improve their study routines such as doing their homework in the
evening consequently improving their school performance.
Inequality in access to and distribution of housing condition-related basic oppor-
5Consumption expenditure is used instead of household income because it is easily identifiable
and comparable across households unlike income, which has multiple sources, especially for
rural households.
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tunities is measured for children aged 0 to 16 years. The CHIP did not ask direct
questions for all the housing conditions and therefore proxy questions have been
used. For water, urban households were asked about the situation of their drinking
water on a 5-point scale with higher values representing better service. Households
who responded 3, 4, or 5 were classified as having access to safe drinking water.
Migrant households were asked whether they had a kitchen in the household and
not having a kitchen was used as a proxy for lack of direct access to safe water.
Rural households were classified as having access to safe water if they had a tap,
motor-pump, or natural well in the house or courtyard. For sanitation, urban
households were asked about their situation of sanitation on a 5-point scale with
higher values representing better service. Households who responded 3, 4, or 5
were classified as having access to sanitation. Migrant households were directly
asked whether they had or lacked sanitary facilities. Rural households were asked
about the building material of their house and houses that were built from weak
materials such as clay or straw were classified as not having access to sanitation.6
For electricity, all households were asked whether they had electricity or electric
lighting.
The difference in the variables used to identify access to basic opportunities,
specifically for housing condition-related opportunities, is likely to result in vari-
ations in the estimation of inequality. Further, mere access does not mean that
the quality of the basic opportunity is good. However, in the absence of uniform
variables measuring both quantity and quality across the sub-groups this is the
best way forward.
6The assumption is that households who have built their houses using weak materials are very
poor and do not have the resources to build toilets outside their house. On the other hand,
households who built their houses using concrete or bricks were well-off enough to have built
a toilet either inside or outside their house. This is common practice in rural areas in many
developing countries.
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3.3.2.2 Examining the changes in HOI over time
A limitation of the dataset under analysis is its cross-sectional nature. The absence
of migrant samples in the previous rounds (1988 and 1995) of the CHIP makes
comparisons problematic. The 1995 CHIP asks urban individuals the year in
which they obtained urban residence status. In the absence of a migrant sample,
very recent hukou converters could plausibly have been used as a proxy. However,
there are only 73 observations for those who obtained urban residence status in
1995.7 Further, within an urban household the year of obtaining urban residence
status differs for grandparents, parents, and children making identification of
proxy migrants more complex. Given these limitations, the strategy I adopt to
examine temporal effect of being a migrant on HOI is dividing the migrant sample
based on “number of years of residence as a migrant in an urban area”. I use
three cut-off points to classify the migrants - those residing for less than 3 years
classified as recent migrants, those residing for 3-10 years classified as medium-term
migrants, and those residing for more than 10 years classified as long-term migrants.
This results in 294 children from long-term migrant households, 715 children from
medium-term migrant households, and 254 children from recent migrant households.
I then decompose the differences (proxy for changes over time) using the property
of additive decomposability of the HOI into the scale effect, that is, change in
average access rate, and distribution effect, that is, change in distribution of the
basic opportunity across the sub-groups. The decomposition can be written as
follows:
Let O1, O2, and O3 represent the HOI for long-term, medium-term, and recent
migrants respectively. The average access rates for the three sub-groups are p1,
p2, and p3 respectively, and D-indices are D1, D2, and D3 respectively. Then the
change in HOI can be decomposed as,
7It is appropriate to use hukou converters only for 1995 because the survey was conducted
between late-1995 and early-1996. Hukou converters prior to 1995 would probably have
benefited from their status conversion in the one year that passed.
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On+1 −On = p̄n+1(1−Dn+1)− p̄n(1−Dn) (3.6)
where,
4p̄ = [p̄n+1(1−Dn)− p̄n(1−Dn)] (3.7)
and,
4D = [p̄n+1(1−Dn+1)− p̄n+1(1−Dn)] (3.8)
4p̄ is the scale effect and 4D is the distribution effect. The changes in the
HOI of children from these three categories of migrants will provide a sense of
whether hukou reforms and changing attitude towards migrants has had an effect
on inequality of opportunity.
3.3.2.3 Testing the association between inequality of opportunity and
subjective well-being
In addition to computing the inequality of opportunity for children, I also test
the association between inequality of opportunity for children and household
subjective well-being. There is empirical evidence that migrants in China are
less happy as compared to non-migrants, that is, rural residents who decided
not to migrate (Knight and Gunatilaka, 2010). However, whether inequality of
opportunity, specifically the HOI, is associated with the low mean happiness levels
of migrants remains to be examined. Drawing upon a growing body of literature
on the relationship between inequality and subjective well-being, I use subjective
standard of living (or relative status), self-reported level of happiness, and feelings
of upward mobility as the variables to capture well-being effects of inequality of
opportunity on migrant households (Diener et al., 1995; McBride, 2001; Graham
and Pettinato, 2002; Graham and Felton, 2006; Graham and Picon, 2009). First,
subjective standard of living is measured by asking the question “which group do
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you believe your current standard of living belongs to”. Responses are recorded on
a 4-point scale ranging from “lowest 25 percent” to “highest 25 percent”. Second,
the question asked to measure self-reported happiness is “generally speaking, do
you feel happy”. Responses are recorded on a 5-point scale ranging from “not happy
at all” to “very happy” recalibrated such that lower figures correspond to lower
levels of happiness. And third, feelings of upward mobility are measured by asking
the question “compared with living in rural areas, do you think living in urban
areas makes you happier” only to migrant households. Responses are recorded on
a 3-point scale ranging from “less happy” to “happier”, again, recalibrated.
I estimate the following baseline bivariate OLS regression specification:
Yi = β0 + β1Oi + εi (3.9)
where, Yi is the specified well-being variable of household i and Oi is the
estimated HOI for children belonging to the specific sub-group. Multiple regression
models are not estimated as the HOI itself is computed based on household
background characteristics and including them as covariates would be redundant
(cause collinearity) and bias the the effect of HOI. All well-being variables have been
recoded such as a higher value on the scale represents a higher level of well-being.
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Estimates of inequality of opportunity
A comparison of the three sub-groups in Table 3.1 suggests that the distribution
of children according to their circumstances varies across most variables but is
similar across some. Migrant children are younger when compared to their urban
and rural counterparts. This is because the age of migrant parents is lower when
compared to urban and rural parents. This is also plausibly why the mean health
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status of migrant fathers and mothers is better than urban and rural parents.8
Parental education, which has been found to be a significant circumstance
variable in determining, differs across the sub-groups. Migrant parents are more
educated than rural parents, which is likely due to the fact that finding a job in
urban areas required slightly higher levels of education and skills. The number of
children in the household is highest for the rural sub-group followed by the migrant
sub-group. Minority children are concentrated in the rural areas while children
who parents are members of the CCP are highest in urban areas. Though some
urban households are richer as compared to rural and migrant households, the
mean log consumption of urban and migrant households is equivalent.
Analysis based on residence status shows significant disparities in the coverage
of some basic opportunities. As observed in Table 3.2, while school enrollment is
comparable across all sub-groups, it is the completion of primary school on time
that is highly skewed. As compared to 97.29 percent of urban children and 90.90
percent of rural children who completed primary education on time, only 48.30
percent of migrant children completed primary education on time. Among the three
categories of migrants, medium-term and recent migrant children have the lowest
coverage of completing primary education on time. Housing condition-related basic
opportunities also vary greatly by residence status. It is seen from Table 3.3 that
the coverage of safe water and sanitation is lowest among migrant children. This
is mainly because it was identified from the survey that migrant households either
completely lack water and sanitation facilities or share the facilities with other
households. Coverage of electricity is nearly universal.
8Mean age of fathers in the sample is 48 years, 46 years, and 35 years for urban, rural, and
migrant households respectively. Mean age of mothers in the sample is 47 years, 44 years,


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.2 – Coverage (in percentage) of basic opportunities in education




Long-term migrant 94.39 57.41
Medium-term migrant 91.06 43.00
Recent migrant 84.92 50.00
All 90.98 88.96
Table 3.3 – Coverage (in percentage) of basic opportunities in housing conditions
Water Sanitation Electricity
Urban 97.77 94.74 100.00
Rural 83.30 80.28 99.66
Migrant 55.52 57.25 100.00
Long-term migrant 55.75 55.75 100.00
Medium-term migrant 55.49 59.59 100.00
Recent migrant 55.33 52.46 100.00
All 83.79 81.28 99.78
Before delving into the estimates of D-index and HOI, it is important to clarify
again that the interpretation in the following sections draw upon the definitions of
D-index and HOI as explained previously and do not imply that the society is a
closed loop and the disadvantaged group can be helped only if opportunities or
resources are taken away from the advantaged groups. The D-index in Tables 3.4
and 3.5, which represents the degree of inequality, suggests striking dispersions
across the sub-groups. For migrant children, 15.91 percent of the opportunities
for children to complete primary education on time need to be reallocated (in
statistical terms) to eliminate differences. This estimate is nearly 15 times that for
urban children and 5 times that for rural children. Of interest is the incredibly
high degree of inequality for the three categories of migrants. As is seen from the
results, children of recent migrants are a lot worse-off than migrant children whose
families have been residing in urban areas for longer periods of time. Inequality of
opportunity in water and sanitation is again significantly high for migrant children
as compared to their urban and rural counterparts. However, the trend of recent
migrants being worse-off is not observed for inequality of opportunity in housing
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conditions. Long-term and recent migrant children are almost similarly worse-off
with regards to water and sanitation.
Table 3.4 – D-index (in percentage) of basic opportunities in education




Long-term migrant 3.40 24.73
Medium-term migrant 4.91 21.99
Recent migrant 9.47 45.45
All 1.95 5.24
Table 3.5 – D-index (in percentage) of basic opportunities in housing conditions
Water Sanitation Electricity
Urban 1.27 1.82 0.00
Rural 6.56 11.07 0.24
Migrant 15.98 16.24 0.00
Long-term migrant 23.58 26.08 0.00
Medium-term migrant 14.95 13.09 0.00
Recent migrant 21.83 24.06 0.00
All 7.80 9.71 0.17
When coverage and inequality of opportunity are combined into the HOI, stark
variations are again observed across the sub-groups as is seen in Tables 3.6 and
3.7. With respect to completing primary education on time, only 40.61 of all
opportunities needed to ensure universal access are both available and allocated
equitably (that is, access and distribution in statistical terms) for migrant children.
This is nearly half when compared to the opportunities available and equitably
distributed for urban and rural children. Within the migrant sub-group, only 27.27
percent of needed opportunities for universal completion of primary education on
time are available and distributed fairly for children of recent migrants, much less
than children of long-term and medium-term migrants. Similarly, for water and
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sanitation, opportunities available and equitably distributed are significantly less
for migrant children as compared to urban and rural children. Further, within
migrants, opportunities in sanitation are the least for children of recent migrants
and opportunities in water for them is also low.
Table 3.6 – HOI (in percentage) of basic opportunities in education




Long-term migrant 91.18 43.21
Medium-term migrant 86.59 33.54
Recent migrant 76.88 27.27
All 89.21 84.30
Table 3.7 – HOI (in percentage) of basic opportunities in housing conditions
Water Sanitation Electricity
Urban 96.54 93.02 100.00
Rural 77.84 71.39 99.42
Migrant 46.65 47.95 100.00
Long-term migrant 42.61 41.21 100.00
Medium-term migrant 47.19 51.79 100.00
Recent migrant 43.25 39.84 100.00
All 77.25 73.39 99.61
It is clear from the analysis so far that migrant children consistently rank lower
across different opportunities (except for access to electricity, which is nearly
universal for the entire population). This is reflected in the overall HOI, which is
the simple average of the HOI of each basic opportunity, and can be interpreted
as the proportion of available opportunities that has been distributed according
to the principle of equality of opportunity. A higher overall HOI indicates more
equality. It is seen from Table 3.8 that there is uneven progress in ensuring equality
of opportunity across the sub-groups. While 84.75 percent of all the available basic
97
opportunities are equally distributed among the entire population of children, only
64.43 percent are equally distributed for migrant children. Within migrants, only
57.45 of all the available basic opportunities are equally distributed for children of
recent migrants.9
Table 3.8 – Overall HOI (in percentage) of basic opportunities
Coverage D-index HOI
Urban 96.44 1.59 94.93
Rural 88.92 4.58 85.09
Migrant 70.40 10.50 64.43
Long-term migrant 72.66 15.56 63.64
Medium-term migrant 69.83 10.99 63.82
Recent migrant 68.54 20.16 57.45
All 88.96 4.97 84.75
Notes: Figures are simple averages of each component across each basic opportunity
Having examined the inequality of opportunity for children by residence status in
China, it is imperative to determine what proportion of it is in fact caused by where
households decide to reside. For this purpose the D-index was computed using only
one circumstance variable in each specification. It is observed from Table 3.9 that
indeed residence status contributes most to the inequality in completing primary
education on time and significantly highly to inequality in water and sanitation.
Further, it is observed that not only whether the child is from a migrant household,
but also where the parents decide to migrate that results in significant inequality.
Province of residence contributes most to the inequality in enrollment, water, and
sanitation. Part of explanation for this lies in the unequal development in China
typical in countries experiencing rapid economic growth.
9For purposes of comparison, Barros et al. (2009) find that in Latin America, Chile has the
highest HOI of 91 percent across the same set of basic opportunities. The HOI for China
as a whole is comparable to Argentina (88 percent), Costa Rica (86 percent), Venezuela (86





































































































































































































































































































































































































































A positive observation, as seen is Table 3.10, is that long-term migrants are
better off as compared to recent migrants suggesting that time of residence in
urban areas along with hukou policy reforms likely have a positive effect on access
to basic opportunities for children. A decomposition of change in HOI across
migrant categories reveals that the positive effect is partially due to an increase in
available opportunities and partially due to improvement in distribution, though
the changes are not consistent. An increase in both availability and distribution is
observed for enrollment and sanitation but not for the other basic opportunities
indicating that a lot remains to be desired from social policy in China.
3.4.2 Association between inequality of opportunity and subjective
well-being
A look at the mean well-being levels by residence status sub-groups in Table 3.11
reveals that migrants report the lowest levels of well-being. Interestingly, rural
households report the highest levels of subjective standard of living and happiness
when compared to urban households. Knight and Gunatilaka (2010) and Knight,
Song, and Gunatilaka (2009) have attributed this to reference group effects. They
argue that rural households are happier because they have limited information
sets and narrow reference groups. Further they argue that migrant households
compare themselves to their new reference group, that is, urban households, and
have higher aspirations, which make them less happy. Among the sub-group of
migrants, long-term migrants report themselves to be the happiest and have better
subjective standard of living and upward mobility as compared to migrants who
have lived in cities for shorter periods of time. While this might be due to genuine
improvement in their standard of living and opportunities it might also be argued
that this is due to “adaptation” (Graham, 2011). Long-term migrants might be






























































































































































































































































































































































































and have developed a collective tolerance for the “bad equilibrium”.
Of particular interest is the association between subjective measures of well-being
and HOI. While previous studies by Knight and Gunatilaka (2010) and Knight,
Song, and Gunatilaka (2009) find that migrants are less happy as compared
to their rural counterparts they do not examine the specific role of inequality
of opportunity in driving this unhappiness or lower subjective well-being. The
results in Table 3.12 fill this gap and provide an insight into whether reduction in
inequality is associated with increased subjective well-being. The table summarizes
the bivariate association between HOI and three separate dependent variables -
subjective standard of living, happiness, and upward mobility - for all households
and the migrant sub-group. The results suggest that an increase in HOI, that
is, opportunities available and fairly distributed for children, is positively and
significantly associated with subjective standard of living for the full sample as
well as for the sub-group of migrants. Further, an increase in HOI is positively
and significantly associated with happiness but it does not hold when I examine
only the migrant sub-group. The insignificant relationship between HOI and
happiness is counterintuitive to the hypothesis that an increase in HOI should
be positively correlated with happiness of migrants. It is not entirely clear why
this might be. A possible explanation is “adaptation”, where over time adversity
does not significantly affect absolute happiness (Graham, 2011).10 When asked
about feelings of upward mobility, migrants seem to be well aware of how their
lives compare in relative terms to those in rural areas as is observed from the
significant and positive association between HOI and feelings of upward mobility. It
implies that migrants believe that their lives are much are better in urban areas as
compared to living in rural areas. The positive and significant association between
HOI and subjective standard of living as well as upward mobility suggests that
10Graham (2011) finds that respondents in conflict-ridden Afghanistan reported themselves to
































































































































































































































































































































































































































reducing inequality of opportunity could be a possible policy goal to improve the
well-being of migrants.
Table 3.12 – Summary of bivariate regression estimations: Association between
HOI and subjective well-being
Independent variable: HOI All Households Migrant Households
Dependent variables (1) (2)




Upward mobility - 0.038∗∗∗
- 0.007
Observations 16598 1992
Notes: Bivariate OLS estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Estimates are
weighted using sampling weights. Dependent variables are 4-step subjective standard of
living, 5-step happiness, and 3-step upward mobility. Mobility question was asked only
to migrant households.
∗ p < 0.10 , ∗∗ p < 0.05 , ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
3.5 Why are migrant children disadvantaged?
Clearly, the empirical evidence shows that there is a high degree of inequality of
opportunity for children in China with urban children at one end of the spectrum
and migrant children at the other. Further, an analysis of the contribution of each
circumstance reveals that residence status and province contribute significantly
to the inequality of opportunity for migrant children. Inequality of opportunity
exists not only in education but also in safe and conducive living conditions, which
are essential for future development and mobility. The disadvantaged situation of
migrant children and the contribution of residence status and province of residence
in widening the opportunity gap highlights that the hukou system in China is
a serious barrier for the human development of migrants. And this is further
complicated by local laws of different urban areas.
Let us begin by examining the inequality of opportunity in education. Even
though the 1986 law in China guarantees nine years of free and compulsory educa-
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tion to all children between six and 14 years of age the differences in educational
inequality of opportunity for urban, rural, and migrant children brought forth
through this analysis are glaring. Previous studies have found that local govern-
ment or public schools are only responsible for educating children registered in
their areas and have no obligation to educate migrant children. This is mainly
because the costs of keeping a child in school for public schools are high and they
are often struggling for resources to provide adequate educational facilities for
officially registered children. Migrants parents also have to pay “special high fees”
to send their children to public schools. With limited access to public schools
and private schools being beyond the means of their parents, migrant children are
faced with constraints on educational choices. Owing to these constraints migrant
parents are forced to send their children to underground or “black” schools, which
thrive in migrant neighborhoods but are not registered and recognized by the local
government. They mostly exist to fill a supply gap and ensure that migrant children
do not slip through the cracks of the system (Kwong, 2004; Liang and Chen, 2007).
Kwong (2004) and Yan (2005) have studied the dismal conditions of these “black”
schools. They find that the main objective of these schools is to keep costs down
and therefore they are housed in abandoned warehouses and buildings with no
libraries, reading rooms, laboratories, or sports facilities. Even the teachers in
these schools are not fully trained, which significantly affects student performance.
Yet another obstacle for migrant children is that many urban local governments
have made it mandatory that they return to their villages and hometowns once
they complete primary education (Yan, 2005). It is therefore possible that many of
them remain in primary school just because their parents do not want them to be
separated. It is then no surprise that the results in this chapter find that the rate
of completing primary education on time among migrant children is the lowest.
Enrollment rates for migrant children are not extremely low possibly because the
survey only asks whether the child goes to school and not what type of school she
attends. Therefore, even though the child might be attending a “black” school the
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parents still report them as being enrolled.
Coming to inequality of opportunity in housing conditions and basic services,
it has been documented that migrants are in general disadvantaged and that the
hukou system outweighs the socioeconomic factors in affecting the living conditions
and choices available for housing (Wu, 2002; 2004). Migrants cannot avail of bank
mortgages that may enable them to purchase new homes in better neighborhoods.
Also, purchasing a house in the secondary housing market in urban China requires
local hukou so that option is also out of reach for the migrants. Further, subsidized
public housing in cities is available only to registered urban residents. With these
constraints the migrants often rent private housing or dormitories, which are
crowded and lack proper kitchens and sanitary facilities. Interestingly, using a
survey of migrant housing conditions in Beijing and Shanghai, Wu (2004) finds
that majority of the migrants consider their housing conditions much worse than
those back in their villages. This is plausibly the reason why results in this chapter
indicate that the inequality of opportunity in housing conditions for rural children
is lower than that for migrant children. The impact of inequality of opportunity
in housing conditions for children is not limited to lack of space and facilities but
extends to their health. It has been found that high incidence of infectious and
water-borne diseases such as malaria, hepatitis, and typhoid prevail among migrant
children mainly due to the poor and crowded living conditions and poor hygiene
(Zheng and Lian, 2005).
Oftentimes, individuals or parents decide to migrate because they believe that
their decision will improve their and their families’ quality of life. However, given
that the disadvantaged situation of migrant children can have a lasting impact on
their overall development as well as intergenerational mobility it is not surprising
that their households (parents) report low levels of subjective well-being. The
results also indicate that improving the HOI for migrant children is positively
associated with the subjective standard of living and feelings of upward mobility of
migrant households. Though more research is needed for clear policy prescriptions,
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reducing the inequality of opportunity for children by improving the outcomes
could be a policy tool for improving the well-being of migrants.
3.6 Conclusion
While previous studies have pointed to the institutional and social constraints faced
by rural-urban migrants in China, this is the first study to empirically measure the
degree of inequality of opportunity for migrant children as compared to urban and
rural children. This analysis holds significance because as China continues its rapid
growth, the rate of urbanization and consequently the rate of rural-urban migration
is expected to go up. The findings of this chapter suggest that migrant children are
at a significantly greater disadvantage as compared to urban and even rural children
essentially because of their residence or registration status, which deprives them of
access to social services. Inequality of opportunity for them exists both in access
to education as well as in access to basic services such as water and sanitation that
are necessary for life-long development. A further contribution that this analysis
makes is to examine the association between inequality of opportunity for migrant
children and the subjective well-being of their households to provide an alternative
explanation for the low subjective well-being among rural-urban migrants in China.
I find that reducing inequality of opportunity for migrant children is not significantly
associated with happiness of migrant households. However, it is positively and
significantly associated with their subjective standard of living and feelings of
upward mobility, implying that improving the outcomes for migrant children could
be a policy tool for improving the well-being of migrant households.
The findings underscore that growth rarely goes hand in hand with equality. For
China, the experience has been peculiar because of its transition from a relatively
egalitarian, centrally planned society to a market-oriented economy. From a policy
perspective, complete and immediate overhaul of hukou system is difficult and
may be even impossible primarily for political reasons. However, inequality of
opportunity faced by migrant children due to this institutional barrier is likely to
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have detrimental and long-term consequences for migrants and for urban society as
a whole. A serious consequence of ignoring migrant children could be the creation
of a vicious cycle of intergenerational inequality and urban poverty.
An area of inequality needing immediate attention is the education of migrant
children. It has to be understood that education is a basic right and not a
privilege and therefore migrant children cannot be denied affordable and good
quality education in public schools. The feasibility of implementing these policy
prescriptions is not entirely clear but if possible the special high fees for migrant
children should be lowered or abolished, access to higher education in the city
itself should be made easier, and the underground or “black” schools should be
given recognition and provided facilities so that migrant children can be brought
into mainstream education. Inequality in housing is a slightly more complex issue.
Without a complete understanding of the legal system and housing demand and
supply, it is difficult to prescribe precise policy options. However, some of them
that do not require a complete revamp of the registration laws could be explored
such as ensuring basic tenant rights to migrants so that they can demand better
services and landlords are deterred from exploiting their situation, and opening
up the secondary housing market to migrants so that they have the option to
purchase better quality housing in better neighborhoods. In summary, the central
and local governments need to be cognizant of the fact that reducing rural-urban
inequality in China in the long-term depends largely on whether migrant children
are provided the necessary basic opportunities.
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